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INDENTURE SECURITIES AND THE BARKLEY BILL
By TALCOTT M. BANKS, JR.t
THE sale to the public of corporate obligations issued under indentures
of trust1 has been one of the chief means by which American commerce
and industry have financed their extraordinary growth. The practical
success of this method and the vitality of the interests which it has served
have carried it through a century of development with remarkably little
attention to the accompanying law. In consequence, when a period of
critical examination suddenly arrived, the accumulation of faults in the
practice of this mode of financing was exposed against a background of
legal uncertainties. The confusion in precedents has encouraged pro-
ponents of change to search for comprehensive remedies, and in the
resulting discussion the simple question of how to improve indenture
financing, without impairing its utility, has at times been obscured.
The general re-examination of the subject of corporate trust indentures
was stimulated by the publication of a vigorous report of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The Commission, in the course of its in-
vestigation of protective and reorganization committees, had studied the
corporate indenture trustee, and of its series of reports Part VI, trans-
mitted to Congress on June 18, 1936,2 dealt with corporate indentures
and concluded with a strong recommendation for specific legislation.
This recommendation was carried out in the Barkley Bill,3 introduced
in the Senate May 6, 1937.
,Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
1. Indenture securities in the United States are popularly classified as "bonds"
(long-term secured), "debentures" (long-term unsecured) and "notes" (short-term,
either secured or unsecured). These names should not, however, be relied upon as e.'mct
definitions, for variations are not infrequent, such as debentures being secured in various
ways. As ordinarily the issuer or obligor is a corporation, and the usual security is a
mortgage, the term "corporate mortgage" has been Widely adopted to refer to the instru-
ment under which indenture securities are issued.
In England the term "debenture" is used generally to include all forms of bonds. PAL-
mER'S COMPANY LAW (14th ed. 1930) 300 ff. Although the trust concept is peculiar
to the common law, financing by indenture securities has appeared in some civil law
jurisdictions: Nussbaum, Sociological and Comparative Aspects of the Trust (193S)
38 CoL. L. Rv. 408, 418, 419, 429-430; see Zahn, The Trustee in German-Amcrican In-
dustrial Loans (1932) 12 B. U. L. REv. 187, 428.
2. This report, and sb others already published, are based on the investigation of
protective and reorganization committees, authorized by § 211 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C., § 78 (1934). Part VI will hereafter be referred
to as "the EPoRT."
3. Originally S. 2344, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H. R. 10292, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1938). The measure was reintroduced in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the 76th Congress on January 10, 1939, and is now numbered S.477
and H. R. 2191, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
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Prepared under the auspices of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the Barkley Bill represents the first attempt to solve the prob-
lems of the present-day corporate indenture by national legislation. Al-
though final adjournment of the Seventy-Fifth Congress came before
the bill was debated in either chamber, it was extensively discussed in
committee hearings in both the Senate and the House,4 and was reported
favorably to the Senate.' As it has recently been introduced again, it is
now before the Seventy-Sixth Congress for its consideration. Since the
Barkley Bill touches every contemporary problem of corporate indenture
financing, this article will be devoted primarily to the consideration of
that measure in its setting.
HISTORY OF THE CORPORATE INDENTURE
A summary review of the development of indenture securities will
serve to illustrate their unique character.' Indentures have been used as
a basis for the issuance of securities in America for at least a hundred
years, 7 and with the growth and extension of canals and railroads in
the nineteenth century this method of financing was employed with in-
creasing frequency in their construction. 8
The early instances are of more than historical interest, for they demon-
strate the fundamentals of the method and the need which it was devised
to meet. These transportation agencies at first were highly speculative
ventures, with doubtful and fluctuating credit.' Construction or extension
4. See infra note 68.
5. Ibid.
6. For details on the history of the modern indenture see JoNEs, THE LAW oF
RAILROAD AND OTHER CORPORATE SECURITIES (1st ed. 1879) ; SHORT, THE LAW OF RAIL-
WAY BONDS AND MORTGAGES (1897); Stetson, Preparation of Corporate Bonds,
Mortgages, Collateral Trusts and Debenture Indentures, in So-ma L:GAL PHASES or
CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917); PAGE AND GAIS,
THE WORK OF CORPORATE TRUST DEPARTMENTS (1926); SMITH, TnE DrVrVL0P)rNT
OF TRUST COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1928); 2 BOGERT, THE LAW or TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (1935) §246; 'MCCLELLAND AND FISHER, LAW OF CORPORATE MfORTGAGE
BOND ISSUES (1937) ; Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law (1890) 4 TIARv. L. Rrv. 1;
Smith, A Forgotten Chapter in the Early History of the Corporate Trust Deed (1927)
61 Air. L. REv. 900; Posner, Liability of the Trustee under the Corporate Indenture
(1928) 42 HARV. L. REV. 198; Draper, A Historical Introduction to the Corporate Mort-
gage (1930) 2 RocxY MT. L. REv. 71. See also an essay on the English practice of
mortgaging tolls to finance the construction of toll roads in (1827) 4 LAW TRActs 97.
7. What is currently accepted as the earliest example is the "Dutch loan" of The
Morris Canal and Banking Company, which conveyed its property to an Amsterdam
merchant in trust to secure a loan of $750,000 made by several individuals. See Willink
v. The Morris Canal and Banking Company, 4 N. J. Eq. 377 (1843); RrPORT OF A JOINT
COMMITTEE OF THE DIRECrORS AND STOCKHOLDERS OF THE MORRaS CANAL AND BANKING
COMPANY (1832).
8. See Draper, supra note 6, at 77-86.
9. The original Morris Canal stock issue of $1,000,000 in 1825 was over-subscribed
more than seven times and the stock soon sold at nearly a 20 per cent premium. Within
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required the investment of larger sums than single institutions or indi-
viduals could or would risk. Municipalities, counties, states and the
Federal government subsidized these enterprises in various ways,"° and
speculators supplied funds in large amounts, but a means was needed to
tap the resources of the conservative investing public, which promises of
high interest rates and astonishing appreciation of capital could not attract.
The obvious and familiar instrument for this end was the mortgage,
but a mortgage split among a number of mortgagees involved undesir-
able technical difficulties in transfer and foreclosure, and it lacked the
inducement of negotiability.11 To avoid these troubles, and to enable the
issuer to offer investors a form of security which would approach if not
at once attain a negotiable quality, a plan was adopted whereby the
mortgage ran to a single individual, to be held by him as security for
the notes which subscribers would receive. This individual had two
functions: before default he was merely a repository of the noteholders'
interest in the security, which he held in escrow or as a stakeholder; after
default, if foreclosure was necessary, he was the investors' agent to
effect it. The first duty was purely passive, the second active but still
ministerial; neither corresponded with the duty of a trustee as it is under-
stood today. 2 The position needed only a reliable person, and little
regard was paid to conflicts of interest, as is shown by the common prac-
tice in early canal and railroad mortgages of having as trustee an official
of the issuing company.' 3
a few years the stock sold at one-sixth of that price. The Lehigh Canal Company ex-
perienced similar vicissitudes. See RUoRT OF THE PRES DET AND Dmzcrors OF THE
MORRIS CANAL AND BANKING COMPANY TO THE STOCKHOLPERS FOR rH YEAn 1833.
10. See Stetson, supra note 6, at 5; Draper, supra note 6, at 78. The shift from
governmental financing to financing by private parties is illustrated in the instance of the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. SwIr AND HALE, REPoRT o, THE PRESENT STATE OF THE
CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL (1846); DAvIS AND HALE, LOAN FUR THE COMFLETO.;
OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL (1847) ; REPORT TO THE STOCEIIOLDES ON TlE
COMPLETION OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL (1851); WAV, .THE: EIx DEVLa.-
OPMENT OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL PROJECT, JOHNS HOPKNtS UMVEvsIrv
STUDIES ON HIsTOIC.AL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, Series XVII, Nos. 9, 10, 11 (1899).
11. Mortgages running to the individual bondholders have, however, been employed.
King v. Tuscumbia, C. & D. R. R., 7 Pa. L. J. 166, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 7S03 (N. D. Ala.
1846) ; Railroad Company v. Orr, 18 \Vall. 471 (U. S. 1873). Another complication
in this method would be encountered when the mortgagees were not all ascertained, either
in number or in name, at the time of the original transaction.
12. In the case involving the Mforris Canal deed of 1830 this individual vas described
as "the agent and trustee of the several subscribers." The opinion states that "ie was
the agent of the company in making the loan, and is declared by the mortgage to be the
representative of the lenders also." Willink v. The Morris Canal and Banking Com-
pany, 4 N. J. Eq. 377, 381, 396 (1843). The phrase "nominal trustee" was used in an
early text. JoNEs. MORTGAGES (2d ed. 1879) § 1383.
13. Stetson, supra note 6, at 6; Draper, supra note 6, at 84; Posner, The Trustee
and the Trust Indenture, a Furthcr Study (1937) 46 YaLE L. J. 737, 738. See infra note
28; Ashuelot Railroad Company v. Elliott, 57 N. H. 397 (1874).
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The character of the office of trustee under a corporate indenture was
stamped upon it in these early years, and although it has puzzled courts
and evaded satisfactory definition to the present time it has never been
essentially changed. 4 The reason for this constancy is that it suits the
business need. It is a great convenience to have an intermediary in
exactly this position, and although the development and tremendous com-
plication of the indenture have blurred the outline of the trustee's func-
tions, no fundamental revision of them has apparently ever become im-
perative to preserve or increase the indenture's utility.
In considering the development of the corporate indenture it will be
helpful to separate the interests involved. First is the interest of the issuer
or obligor. The entire transaction is designed for its benefit." In return
for encumbering its property, it obtains the money it needs. If this
method of financing should be so altered as to become unworkable, it
alone would suffer directly. Second is the interest of the investor. I-iq
primary care is, of course, that the issuer should protect his capital and
income by meeting its interest and principal obligations faithfully and
otherwise keeping its credit good; beyond that his sole concern is in the
fullest possible realization upon the security if irremediable default occurs.
Finally, there is that vague, pervading presence, the public interest, in
the name of which a great deal may be done or undone, but which here
may reasonably be confined to keeping the indenture method from becom-
ing either a vehicle for fraud or oppressive and unfair, in fact or poten-
tially, to either of the principal parties."7
Each significant innovation in the development of the corporate trust
indenture manifests a single purpose, to increase the efficacy of the in-
strument in view of the main end of raising funds. Sometimes the
interest of the issuer is particularly evident, as in the various steps in
which additional assets, present and prospective, were turned to use as
security, until every conceivable form of property, tangible and intangible,
presently owned or to be acquired, came to be covered by the indenture.
More usually the regard is clearly for the interest-of the investor, as in
14. The relatively little change in the nature of the trustee's functions, before and
after default, and the controversy over his legal position, can be traced in indentures,
cases and early treatises. See supra notes 6, 7 and 12, infra notes 24, 25, 26. See espe-
cially JONEs, op. cit. supra note 6, at §§ 357, 360; SnrR, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 258.
15. In Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401, 403-404 (1883), Waite, C. 5., said:
"The mortgage, with the issue and distribution of bonds under it, creates a trust, of
which the selected mortgagee, or his duly constituted successor, is the trustee, and the
bondholders primarily, and the stockholders ultimately, the beneficiaries-." If trust analo.
gies are required, this suggests the interesting, although inexact, comparison of a trustee
of a personal trust having both life beneficiaries and remaindermen.
16. That is, if the flotation of indenture securities becomes so expensive or difficult
as to be of little use to business.
17. The others directly concerned are the trustee, who should have no personal inter-
est as such, and the investment banker, whose interest is secondary or representative.
[Vol. 48: 533
SECURITIES AND THE BARKLEY BILL
the acceleration clause; provisions restricting the release and substitution
of security, the issue of additional bonds and the application of proceeds;
requirements for recordation; sinking fund arrangements; and the great
elaboration of the provisions defining rights of entry, foreclosure and
sale. The repelling complexity of the modern indenture is in large degree
the result of attempts to make it attractive to the investing public through
the addition of safeguards." As the property forming the eventual
security increased in size and variety, its conservation and maintenance
became increasingly difficult to assure. Intricate covenants obliging the
issuer to protect the value of the security came into general use, and the
method of requiring certificates was adopted as a practicable means of
checking performance. The advantages of foreclosure and the possibility
of profitable sale diminished or vanished, to be inadequately replaced by
the right to recognition of a priority in reorganization proceedings. The
railroad reorganizations which followed the panic of 1893 severely tested
the indentures of that day, and as a result of the extensive studies made
at that time many details of the modern form were settled.1
During this gradual evolution the trustee's express powers, and to
a lesser extent its duties, were constantly increased,20 largely in the in-
terests of the investor. The individual began to be supplanted by the
corporate trustee,2 at first to avoid the problems incidental to a trustee's
death,2  later to assure greater competence under the growing burden.
Authentication and certification, the authorization of collateral release,
the approval of the issue of additional indenture securities and many
.other duties, hmostly of a ministerial character, were imposed upon the
trustees for discharge before default, during the normal life of the trust.
But there is no evidence that the business intention was at any time to
give the trustee active supervision over the obligor's fulfillment of his
obligations. 3 The numerous covenants designed to prevent impairment
18. Stetson, supra note 6, at 8, 16, 21, 22, 24. The statement in the rEro.rr, p. 9,
that "since security holders generally are not discriminating in appraising the adequacy
of indenture provisions, it generally adds nothing to the sales value of the security to
insert in it adequate protective clauses" may have limited specific application, but taken
broadly it seems erroneous.
19. Stetson, supra note 6, at 13.
20. For a list of typical duties imposed by the modem indenture, see McCollom,
The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Trustees (1936) 36 CoL L.
REv. 1197, 1205 ff.
21. It has been stated that the earliest corporate indenture to a corporate trustee
was made by the President and Directors of the Beaver Meadow Railroad and Coal
Company to the Girard Life Insurance, Annuity and Trust Company in 1839. Corporate
trustees became general after 1880. Smith, supra note 6, at 903, 911.
22. See SHoRT, op. cit. supra note 6, § 258. When John Davis, one of the trustees
under the New York and Erie Railroad Company mortgage of 1833, died, a supple-
mental instrument was used to secure the substitution of John C. Bancroft Davis (later
reporter of the United States Supreme Court) as successor trustee.
23. lfcCollom, supra note 20 at 1202. The opposite is indicated, if not established,
by the proliferation of exculpatory and immunity clauses.
1939]
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of the security were covenants of the obligor, and the trustee's duties
were to receive and check statements of the obligor or its agents showing
that the proper requirements were being uniformly observed. The addi-
tional responsibilities appear to have been confided to the trustee not as
the aggressive champion of the security-holders, but as a person of com-
petence and impartiality who would administer these duties with mechan-
ical exactitude.24 With respect to the period before the occurrence of
a serious default, the ideal of the corporate indenture trustee, as evolved
by men of business for a business purpose, may be stated in terms of an
impersonal mechanism, reacting automatically in the predetermined way
whenever action should be necessary. After default the duties of the
trustee might become onerous and exacting to a degree, but as usually
a court soon stepped in to command the property and order reorganization
most of these extraordinary responsibilities would normally be of short
duration.
If this was the trustee's intended position, however, it was :at times
very difficult to obtain its judicial recognition.", Eighty years ago a state
supreme court, admitting the novelty of such trustees and seeking to
locate them accurately, respected the tradition of the name and concluded
that the indenture trustee, at least after foreclosure, was bound by the
same standards of fiduciary obligation that a private trustee must observe
towards his beneficiaries." The forthright language of this decision has
24. See Posner, supra note 6, at 202. For a discussion of the trustee's position, as
seen at the end of the nineteenth century, see SHORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at §§ 258,
270-271; Fowler, Legal Responsibility of Trustees under Corporate Bonds and Mori-
gages, or Deeds of Trust (1890) 24 Ams. L. REv. 703.
25. See SHoRT, op. cit. supra note 6, at §§ 270-271; JONEs, op. cit. supra note 6, at
§§ 357, 360; Posner, supra note 13, at 739, 794.
26. Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1 (1858). This case involved a bill in equity brought
by holders of the majority of the indenture securities against the trustees, who had fore-
closed after default and subsequently leased the mortgaged premises. The bill sought
the appointment of a receiver and avoidance of the lease, on the grounds that the trustees,
after foreclosure, were trustees of a "mere nominal, naked or dry trust" and had no
powers or duties except to convey the estate to the cestuis. The bill was dismissed, by a
divided court. Chief Judge Redfield, for the majority, said in his opinion: "We think
it could scarcely escape the notice of any one, who had seriously and patiently attempted
to master this question, that until the actual foreclosure of the mortgage the trusts in-
volved in the contract and imposed upon the trustees named are entirely fiduciary and
executory. At first, and so long as prompt payment is made, it is understood, in prac-
tice indeed, that the office of such trustees is rather silent, and the duties of the trtistees,
by means of the negotiability of the bonds and of the coupons attached, are ordinarily
performed, or expected to be performed, by the corporation or its officers . ..
"But after the forfeiture occurs either by non-payment of interest or principal, or
both, as in the present case, the duties of the trustees become, not only active and re-
sponsible but critical and delicate. It not only is not a dead, dry trust, but is one of the
most active and momentous responsibility . . . ." Pp. 54 ff.
The remainder of the opinion develops the extent and character of that responsibility.
The comments of a dissenting judge upon this decision, in the later case of Miller v.
Rutland and Washington R. R., 36 Vt. 452, 483-484 (1863), are of interest.
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had a strong influence. No courts have gone so far as to hold the trustee
to such a standard before default, but there has been a willingness to
"imply" duties before default from the nature of the relationship betveen
trustee and security holders, even though such duties are not found in,
or are expressively negatived by, the terms of the indenture itself." The
distance which this theory of implication might be carried in any case
remains conjectural, for the decisions have neither limited nor defined
it to a trustworthy extent.
For nearly a century corporate trust indentures, no doubt with these
holdings in mind or in prospect, have included exculpatory clauses
relieving trustees from all liability except for gross negligence or wilful
default.2 These clauses were not indigenous to corporate indentures;
27. Miles v. Vivian, 79 Fed. 848 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897); Frishmuth v. Farmers Loan
& Trust Co., 95 Fed. 5 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1899), aff'd, 107 Fed. 169 (C. C. A. 2d,
1901); Guardian Trust Co. v. White Cliffs Portland Cement & Chalk Co., 109 Fed. 523
(C. C. IV. D. Ark. 1901); Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Wichita, 123 Fed. 762
(C. C. D. Kans. 1903) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Atlantic Coast Electric IL IL, 138 Fed.
517 (C. C. A. 3d, 1905); New York Trust Co. v. Michigan Traction Co., 193 Fed. 175
(fV. D. Mich. 1912) ; Hoffman v. First Bond & Mortgage Co., 116 Conn. 320, 164 Atl.
656 (1933) ; Lyman v. Stevens, 123 Conn. 591, 197 Ad. 313 (1938) ; Myers v. American
National Bank & Trust Co., 277 Ill. App. 378 (1934) ; First National Fire Insurance Co.
v. Salisbury, 130 Mass. 303 (1881); Polhemus v. The Holland Trust Co., 59 X. J. Eq.
93, 45 Atl. 534 (1900), aff'd, 61 N. J. Eq. 654, 47 Ad. 417 (1900); Rhinelander v. Far-
mers Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 519, 65 N. E. 499 (1902); Patterson v. Guardian
Trust Co., 144 App. Div. 863, 129 N. Y. Supp. 807 (3d Dep't 1911); Starr v. Clase
National Bank, N. Y. L. J. Sept. 21, 1936, p. 771, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.); Nay Aug LumFkr
Co. v. Scranton Trust Co., 240 Pa. 500, 87 AU. 843 (1913); Moyer %. Norristown-Penm
Trust Co., 296 Pa. 26, 145 Adt. 682 (1929); Welch v. Northern Bank & Trust Co.,
100 Wash. 349, 170 Pac. 1029 (1918); Stuhr v. Yakima Valley Bank & Trust Co., 149
Wash. 400, 271 Pac. 82 (1928); Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Investment Co.,
213 Wis. 415, 250 N. IV. 862 (1934). See also Mercantile Trust Co. v. Portland &
Ogdensburg R. R., 10 Fed. 604 (C. C. D. N. . 1882); Continental Savings Bank v.
New Orleans Drainage Co., 278 Fed. 811 (E. D. La. 1922); Merrill v. Farmers Loan &
Trust Co., 24 Hun 297 (1st Dep't N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1881) ; 2 Pmnny, TRUSTS AN D TnUsTES
(7th ed. 1929) § 749; Bangs, The Powers and Duties of a Trust Company When Acting
As Trustee Under a Corporate Mortgage (1898) 15 BAEx-. L. J. 79; Fowler, supra note
24; (1931) 40 Y.kL L. J. 1110; (1934) 47 HARv. L. RE%. 882; (1934) 18 Mun;. L.
REv. 604.
28. The earliest example of such a clause which the author has found is in an in-
denture of Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company to Josiah White (the "principal agent"
of the company), Caleb Cope and James Cox, trustees, dated March 7, 1842. The pro-
vision, found at pages 7-8 of the printed document, states that the trustees and their
successors, heirs, etc., "shall at all times hereafter be indenmified by and out of the said
mortgaged premises for all their lawful actings and doings therein in preference to any
other person or persons, and shall not be responsible any one for any other of them, or
for the actings or acts or doings of the said managers, or of any person or persons by
the said parties to these presents or any or either of them nominated, appointed or em-
ployed as aforesaid in the concerns thereof, or for any error of judgment, but only each
for his own individual act of wilful wrong." This indenture, which secured $6,150,000 of
outstanding loans and bonds to be issued, also contained an acceleration clause.
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similar provisions of various sorts in wills and inter vivos trusts had been
considered intermittently by the English courts for at least half a century,
and on several occasions they had been held to be futile.2" The corporate
indenture, however, developed them in various ways and provided other
means as well for escaping immediate responsibility. A clause was devised
relieving a trustee from any duty to act unless indemnified,3" and the
request of a single security holder as a prerequisite to action 3' was changed
to a request from the holders of a certain percentage of the indenture
securities. Similarly, notification by a proportion of the security holders
became a condition precedent to holding the trustee responsible for knowl-
edge that a default existed. 2 As the trustee's duties increased specific ex-
culpatory clauses appeared and multiplied, until in a modern indenture they
may seem to shield a trustee from almost every mistake and misfortune."'
But the actual effect of these sheltering devices is problematical, for the
American courts no less than the courts of England regard them with
evident distaste. In a number of instances their effect has been avoided
on one pretext or another, and in some cases they have been directly
overridden in decisions.34 Because they undoubtedly perform some service
29. Sadler v. Hobbs, 2 Bro. C. C. 95, 29 Eng. Rep. 66 (1786); Brice v. Stokes-,
11 Ves. 319, 32 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1805); Mucklow v. Fuller, Jac. 198, 37 Eng. Rep. 824
(1821) ; Moyle v. Moyle, 2 Russ. & M. 710, 39 Eng. Rep. 565 (1831) ; Pride v, Fool:s,
2 Beav. 430, 48 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1840) ; Fen'viek v. Greenwell, 10 Beav. 412, 50 Eng.
Rep. 640 (1847); Drosier v. Brereton, 15 Beav. 221, 51 Eng. Rep. 521 (1851); Dlb v.
Burford, 19 Beav. 409, 52 Eng. Rep. 408 (1854); Brumridge v. Brumridge, 27 Beay. 5,
54 Eng. Rep. 2 (1858); Budge v. Gummow, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 719 (1872); Cassels, The
Effect of Indemnity Clauses upon Trustecs' Liability for Wilful Default and Neglect,
(1889) 9 CAN. L. T. 1; Shinn, Exoneration Clauses in Trust Instruments (1933) 42 YA1tn
L. J. 359.
The report of Pride v. Fooks, supra, says (pp. 432, 1249) : "The will contained the
usual trustee clauses, that he should only be accountable for losses happening through
his wilful neglect and misconduct, and that he might reimburse himself all costs, charges
and expences," and there is a similar reference to the "usual clause's" in Moyle v. Moyle,
supra, at pp. 710, 566. See also the headnote to Mucklow v. Fuller, supra.
30. See the New York and Erie Railroad mortgage of August 15, 1857, providing
"That neither Trustee shall be answerable for the acts, omissions or defaults of the other
to which he does not give his assent: That each shall be answerable for gros negli-
gence and wilful defaults only . . . That the Trustees shall not be required to act in
the execution of these trusts, except at their own option, unless the party reque.ting them
so to do shall furnish them reasonable indemnity against the loss, cost, trouble and ex-
pense, they may be at in so doing."
31. Such request was requisite for action to foreclose under the Erie mortgage of
March 1, 1849.
32. This is the so-called "ostrich clause," which is of doubtful effect. See infra note
34.
33. For a discussion of the superior effectiveness of these specific clauses, as con-
trasted with the general immunity clause, see Posner, supra note 13, at 788.
34. These cases have .videly divergent grounds of decision. Frishmuth v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., 95 Fed. 5 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1899), aff'd, 107 Fed. 169 (C. C. A.
2d, 1901) (liability predicated upon implied duties, immunity clauses being disregarded) ;
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in mitigating liability, they remain in all their absurd redundancy. If
they were removed from indentures of the present day, synthetic theories
of liability devised to overcome them, and real liabilities which they have
partially stemmed, might combine to overwhelm the trustee. But they
do not afford the complete escape from responsibility which they seem
to offer, and, except in their variety and the extent of their repetition,
they do not represent a modern development.
If there is any assurance to be derived from an historical survey of
the corporate trust indenture, it is that none of the present-day problems
are new. There has been, obviously, a great change in the physical char-
acter of the security, and that has affected the nature and value of the
security holder's remedies. There has also been a change in the trustees,
Richardson v. Union fortgage Co., 210 Iowa 346, 2 N. \W. 103 (1930) (wilful default
found, and also held that the trustee transcended its powers) ; 'Mullen v. Eastern Trust
& Banking Co., 108 'Me. 498, 81 Atl. 948 (1911) (exculpatory clause construed to be
inapplicable); Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Trust Co., 185 Minn. 25, 239 N. W.
766 (1931) (exculpatory clause ineffective when trustee apparently failed to apply funds
properly); Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 450, 102 Ad. 844 (1917), aff'd,
89 N. j. Eq. 584, 106 At. 890 (1917) (trustee transcended its powers) ; Rhinelander v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 519, 65 N. E. 499 (1902) (implied duties not
affected by exculpatory clauses) ; Hunsberger v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 App. Div. 740,
150 N. Y. Supp. 190 (1st Dep't 1914), aff'd, 218 N. Y. 742, 113 N. E. 1058 (1916)
(question of gross negligence should have been given to jury); Doyle v. Chatham &
Phoenix National Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930) (trustee transcended its
powers, liable for misrepresentation), Comment (1930) 40 YA.L L. J. 138, (1931) 31
CoL. L. REv. 858, (1931) 15 Mixx. L. REv. 477; Harvey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 134
Misc. 417, 236 N. Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd ,aithout opinion, 229 App. Div.
774, 242 N. Y. Supp. 905 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd per curiain, 256 N. Y. 526, 177 N. E.
125 (1931) (immunity clause no protection for unauthorized acts "repugnant" to the
trust) ; Starr v. Chase National Bank, N. Y. L. J. Sept. 21, 1936, p. 771, col. 6 (Sup.
Ct) (wilful default found, but also held that the "ostrich clause" and other immunity
provisions do not protect a trustee from liability for defaults "repugnant" to the trust) ;
Colonial Trust Company's Appeal, 241 Pa. 554, 88 Atl. 793 (1913) (wrongful payment
not excusable as a mistake of judgment); WVelch v. Northern Bank & Trust Co., 10
Wash. 349, 170 Pac. 1029 (1918) (trustee liable upon implied obligations, an immunity
provision being disregarded) ; State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 28 P. (2d) 1027 (1934)
(exculpatory clause ineffective because in conflict with the rest of the instrument) ; Mar-
shall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Investment Co., 213 Wis. 415, 250 X. AV. 862 (1934)
(implied duties imposed regardless of exculpatory provisions, including the "ostrich
clause") ; Wbhicher v. National Trust Co., 22 OnT. L. REv. 460 (1910) (trustee acted
beyond its powers), rez'd, National Trust Co. v. Whicher, [1912] A. C. 377. See also
Holmes v. McDonald, 226 Ill. 169, 80 N. E. 714 (1907) (trustee of voluntary associa-
tion); Digney v. Blanchard, 226 fass. 335, 115 N. E. 424 (1917) (trustee of Massa-
chusetts trust) ; Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617 (183) (trustee of personal trust) ;
Fay v. New York Trust Co., N. Y. L. 3. Oct. 30, 1936, p. 455, col. 7 (casting doubt on
the validity of the "ostrich clause"); PAGE AND GAMES, op. cit. mpra note 6, at 152-154;
Jones, The Corporate Trustee Problem (1937) 26 Ky. L. J. 3, 32-33; Payne, Exculpa-
tory Clauses in Corporate Mortgages and Other Instruments (1934) 19 Com;. L Q. 171;
Posner, supra note 13, at 780-790; Comments (1931) 29 Micir. L. RMv. 355, (1933)
33 COL. L. REv. 97, (1937) 37 Cor. L. REv. 130, (1937) 4 U. or Cnm. L REv. 346.
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which are now more competent, often more disinterested, and generally
more vulnerable to lawsuits because of the extent of their activities. The
institutional investor, with adequate research facilities and considerable
powers of self-protection, has grown to be a factor of importance. De-
faults of an obligor are probably less easy to conceal, because of wide-
spread private and governmental publicity, than at any previous time.
Indenture financing still works with unusual success." Why, then, has
the corporate trust indenture at this juncture been made the subject of
investigation and bitter criticism, and what is the reason for the assertion
that now the public interest requires a revolutionary change?
The answer may be found in many factors. The depression commenc-
ing in the United States in 1929 brought numerous defaults in indenture
securities, and they in turn exposed in the most unfortunate manner
excesses characteristic of the preceding years. The financial community
and many trustee institutions suffered a precipitate decline in public
esteem. Further, the typical modern indenture instrument had grown to
ridiculous proportions,36 and its extravagantly complicated phraseology
exemplified the worst obscurantism of the law ;37 its form had no de-
fenders. The use of the term "trustee" in a unique and undefined sense38
35. The new domestic corporate issues of long-term bonds and notes, undoubtedly
for the most part indenture securities, for each of the last ten years for which figures
are available, are as follows:
1928; new capital, $2,174,844,000; refunding, $999,300,000.
1929; new capital, 1,873,464,000; refunding, 495,900,000.
1930; new capital, 2,459,676,000; refunding, 350,652,000,
1931; new capital, 950,664,000; refunding, 677,304,000.
1932; new capital. 271,044,000; refunding, 134,796,000.
1933; new capital, 23,616,000; refunding, 114,876,000.
1934; new capital, 112,104,000; refunding, 174,936,000.
1935; new capital, 322,944,000; refunding, 1,743,120,000.
1936; new capital, 816,456,000; refunding, 3,146,820,000.
1937; new capital, 743,520,000; refunding, 801,588,000.
Total new capital, $9,748,332,000. Total refunding, $8,639,292,000.
U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (Supp. 1938) 70-71. The totals
of similar issues of short-term bonds and notes for the same period are: new capital,
$1,385,868,000, refunding, $823,956,000, and these include an indeterminate proportion
of indenture securities as well. Ibid.
36. It is commonly referred to as "the largest of all legal documents." Draper, supra
note 6, at 94. Its complexity is best appreciated by reference to one of the elaborate
charts or guides published to assist practising lawyers, e.g., EATow, ExrLANATORv OUT-
LINE OF THE FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF BANKERS, TRUSTEES, RLGISThAItS,
TRANSFER AGENTS AND LAWYERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUE OF INVESTMENT SE-
CURITIES (1928) ; HARDING, CORPORATE SECURITIES: A CHART FOR USE IN DETLRMINING
THEIR VALIDITY (1917).
37. An illuminating and entertaining view of the situation is given in Drinker, Con-
cerning Modern Corporate Mortgages (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. R~v. 360.
38. There also may be some question whether the term was not exploited to sell
indenture securities. It has long been recognized that a responsible trustee adds to the
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jarred at a time when the public was being constantly shocked by revela-
tions of abuse of fiduciary authority. A collapse of a real estate bubble,
in which the indenture method had been obviously misused,"0 cast dis-
credit upon established types of indenture financing. As a result of all
this there came a sudden and tremendous volume of litigation concerning
the indenture and the functioning of tie indenture trustee,4" and these
lawsuits served to emphasize the confusion and insufficiency of legal
precedents. Finally, it has been a period distinguished both by ambitious
reforms and a political program of extending controls; and the popular
enthusiasm for reform has at times itself compelled, and has more often
been invoked to justify, a transfer of power from the business and
financial world to a place more nearly within the political orbit.
Each of these original influences is still strong, although events and
the passage of time have tended to emphasize the political aspects while
limiting the importance of others which were formerly prominent. All
have had effect upon the present form of the Barkley Bill, and that effect
must be considered. But the evaluation of the measure itself should not
be adjusted to contemporary currents; it should, so far as possible, be
kept apart from the storm and controversy of both the present and the
all too recent past.
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CommissioN's REPORT
The Commission's Report upon corporate indenture trustees has re-
ceived extensive comment in legal periodicals,41 and no attempt will be
made now at a detailed review. A general consideration of it, however,
is necessary to an understanding of the Barkley Bill, which embodies its
recommendations and carries out its theory.
The Report is a forceful presentation of case histories which illustrate
defects in indentures and shortcomings of trustees, with some instances
of active fraud. It is dramatically written, and throughout it shows a
great deal of skilful research at the service of strong conviction. It casts
a vivid light upon many particulars of the present practice which are in
need of illumination. It has, however, a thesis, forecast in the intro-
duction and continuously evident to the end: that corporate indenture
trustees, in the interests of the investing public, must be stripped of all
saleability of bonds [Knapp v. Railroad Co., 20 Wall. 117, 123 (U. S. 1873)], but this
does not, of course, necessarily imply misrepresentation or general misunderstanding
of an indenture trustee's limited functions.
39. See Part III of the Reports of the Securities and Exchange Commission, CoW.-
inittees for the Holders of Real Estate Bonds (1936) ; McCollom, supra note 20, at 1218.
40. See Posner, supra note 13, at 739.
41. It is vigorously criticized in McCollom, supra note 20, and Wham, Trustees
Under Indentures (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 179. See also Posner, supra note 13; Comment,
Protection for Debenhre Holders (1936) 46 YM.n L. J. 97; Jones, supra note 34; Rodwin,
Trustees under Indentures-The Old Order Changes (1937) 3 Cone. REoIG. 223.
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conflicting interests and changed into active trustees with full fiduciary
duties. Although this thesis is a conclusion drawn from extensive evi-
dence, it appears to have determined the selection of the material incor-
porated in the Report, for little if anything is included which does not
advance the argument.42 In consequence the Report requires considerable
supplementation which will, in a number of instances, tend to modify its
conclusions.
First in importance among the additions needed, an essential if the
Report is to be treated as a basis for proposed legislation, is an adequate
measurement of the cases it describes against the present law of cor-
porate indentures. 43 The insufficiency of the specific references made to
the law in the Report permits some incorrect inferences. The treatment
of exculpatory clauses is a prominent example, for there is little in the
Report to suggest that the protection they offer a trustee is often equivocal,
although that fact is of undoubted significance and goes far to explain
why the best trustees already observe many of the standards which the
Commission would make obligatory.4' Shortly before the publication of
the Report, Hazzard v. Chase National Bank 45 was decided. In that case,
an exculpatory clause was effective to shield a .negligent trustee. The
decision, and particularly its long and sharply worded dictum attacking
present indenture practice and calling for legislation,'41 is relied upon
heavily, but one may reasonably doubt whether the trustee would have
been equally fortunate in another jurisdiction or in slightly altered cir-
cumstances. Beyond any question some of the trustees whose activities
the Report describes would be held liable to security holders by any
court, despite exculpatory clauses, if in litigation the descriptions could
be established as accurate.
42. Other parts of the Commission's reports on Reorganization and Protective Com-
mittees have this characteristic. See Dodd, The Securities and Exchange Cosmmission's
Reform Program for Bankruptcy Reorganizations (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 223, 225;
Swaine, "Democratization' of Corporate Reorganifations (1938) 38 COL. L. Ruv. 256-
258.
43. Mr. Posner's scholarly and valuable article, supra note 13, supplies just such
a background.
44. See McCollom, supra note 20, at 1220. See also note 80 in!ra. The RrorT con-
cedes that some of its criticisms are inapplicable to the highest type of corporate trustee.
REPoRT 25, 31.
45. 159 Misc. 57, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
46. 159 Misc. 57, 83-85, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541, 569-572 (Sup. Ct. 1936). jutice
Rosenman speaks of "how utterly unjust to the investing public is the modern trust in-
denture . . . It is becoming increasingly clear that these indentures, though legally per-
missible, have all the potentialities of fraud upon innocent investors . . . This indenture
was particularly vicious . . . For the inexcusable terms of the indenture, the trustee
cannot be held accountable."
47. For example, various trustees are described in the REPowr as "flagrantly derelict
in the performance of their duty" (p. 18), accepting certificates improper on their face
(pp. 27-28, 35), deliberately suppressing news of a default in order to control a reorgani.
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Further information than the Report gives is also needed on the nature
of the trustee's duties and the manner in which, broadly throughout the
corporate indenture field, they are performed. It is implied at least once
in the Report that, in theory, indenture trustees at one time were the
acknowledged equivalents in responsibility of personal trustees,4s and that
their present restricted activity is a departure dictated by self-interest.
An assumption of this character, which does not accord with the history
of these indentures, may be responsible for inferences and statements,
scattered through the Report, that the modern trustee's relative passivity
is disreputable if not immoral." Both the duties actually performed by
the modern trustee and the risk it assumes are considerably understated
in the Report," and there is little attention paid to the fact that the best
trustees at the present time generally comply with a high standard of
fiduciary conduct.51
A question of salient importance in balancing the advantages and risks
of legislation, and one to which the Report offers no answer, is the actual
extent of the loss suffered by investors by reason of specific faults of
the present practice, particularly the inactivity of trustees. This is un-
doubtedly very difficult to estimate, although in particular instances the
damage is susceptible of calculation.' 2 A few cases of obvious malad-
ministration and consequent loss are leads, but they cannot be taken as
representative in the absence of additional evidence.5 3 Obviously the usual
zation (p. 42) and guilty of "flagrant abuse of fiduciary duty" (p. 87). These instances
would all appear to fall within "gross negligence or wilful default," for which a cor-
porate trustee would invariably be liable notwithstanding immunity provisions. A clause
assuming to protect against such transgressions would be void as against public policy.
See Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321, 325 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918). The emphasis
of these cases shifts to the practical point that abuses exist for which liability, although
legally certain, is not always a deterrent because security holders, lacking the inquisi-
torial powers of an investigator with Congressional authority, are unable to obtain the
facts.
48. "The remedy is to require a return to the theory that a corporate trustee is a
trustee, and that it cannot pretend to be such unless it meets the qualifications, assumes
the duties and discharges the responsibilities of a trustee." Rmonr 69.
49. E.g., [An instance of diverting income] "is symptomatic of the disrepute into
which trusteeship under indentures has fallen." P. 82. "The indictment of the whole sys-
tem of corporate trusteeships implicit in [a witness'] testimony is no overstatement." P.
98. "Such measures [as those the RoaR" recommends] would go far towards curbing
the exploitation of investors which has occurred either at the hands of the trustee itself
or at the hands of the reorganization and management groups with the knowledge, con-
sent, or acquiescence of a complacent and inactive trustee." P. 112.
50 Compare REPORT 68, 70 with McCollom, supra note 20, at 1205 ff., 1222.
51. Posner, supra note 6, at 248; see note 80, infra.
52. E.g., in cases of substitution of collateral or violation of negative pledge clauses.
See REPORT' 10-22. In other instances cited the responsibility for the loss is dificult to
locate. See REPORT 94.
53. The statement at page 37 of the Rxx'oR" that "there is ample evidence that [a
trustee's acceptance of obviously improper statements, intcr alia] reflect the attitude and
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instance of fraud or hidden default occurs when the issuing company is
already in difficulties and the security impaired. An obligor will ordinarily
attempt to comply with its obligations as long as it can. The Report does
not justify contradiction of a statement, made in defense of modern
corporate trustees, that the number of cases where loss may be fixed upon
a failure of the trustee to act, as distinguished from mismanagement, bad
business conditions, or one of the indenture faults generally admitted,
are relatively few."4 How much damage really results from defective
indentures is likewise uncertain.
A further study of the investment banker's role as a representative of
the investors would be welcome. In the cases upon which the Commission
obtained data, the investment banker participated in drafting the indenture
a good part of the time,5 and it would seem clear that in the tistial
instance he must at least have passed upon the fitness of the instrument
before engaging to underwrite the securities. It is true that his primary
concern would be with 'matters other than the prospect of default, but
there is good reason to believe that his interest in the indenture's pro-
tection of prospective purchasers is not as perfunctory as the Report
implies.56 When disaster overtakes a certain security the investment bank-
ing house which marketed it inevitably suffers. Probably it makes little
difference to the individual investor whether the loss is attributable to
a faulty indenture or to broader causes; but the blame for indenture
defects would be particularly easy to fasten on the distributor. It would
be illuminating, in connection with the case histories of securities issued
under unfair or deceptive indentures, to follow the fortunes of the bank-
ing houses which sold them."7
practice of corporate trustees generally" requires further support. It is possible that the
transcripts of testimony taken before the Commission, to which this author has not had
access, contain additional instances, but the REPORT makes no reference at this point,
although in many other parts the RE1oR is fully annotated to the transcripts.
54. McCollom, supra note 20 at 1216-1218, 1226-1227.
55. REPORT 7, 124.
56. REPORT 9-10. See Stetson, supra note 6, at 8, 21, 22; McCollom, supra note 20,
at 1213-1214; Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of t9i3 (1933) 43 YAix
L. J. 171, 199-200.
57. The Kreuger & Toll debentures are given as an instance where huge los.e resulted
from an unsound substitution clause. The subsequent collapse of the firm of Lee, 1Iig-
ginson & Co., which marketed these securities, is familiar history. In another in,;tance
the REPORT states [pp. 54-55] that the investment banking houses made a substantial
settlement with representatives of bondholders under the threat of suit on a basis of
fraud. For the history of American Bond & Mortgage Co. and the various Straus com-
panies, frequently cited by the REIoRr in connection with frauds and defaults in real
estate mortgages, see Part III of the Commission's Reports, supra note 39; In re Amer-
ican Bond & Mortgage Company, 61 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); In re S. W.
Straus & Co., 67 F. (2d) 605 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933). A significant relation is indicated,
although any direct connection between defects in an indenture and failure of an invest.
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A related subject which the Report neglects is the effect of the Securities
Act of 193311 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1' The provi-
sions of the Securities Act which require full disclosure in a prospectus
will undoubtedly operate to correct some flaws in indentures; for a pro-
spectus setting forth accurately, as it now must c0 a faulty substitution
clause, or a negative pledge clause which leaves an easy avenue for eva-
sion, would be detrimental to the security's anticipated market. Inden-
tures which are to be subject to the Securities Act can no longer have
their defects concealed,"' and in consequence draftsmen will be strongly
influenced to take pains to have as many defects as possible eliminated.
The Report does refer 2 to the powers given the Commission by the
Securities Exchange Act to alter and supplement security listing require-
ments on the national exchanges, but their usefulness is minimized," and
the possibilities of the two Acts are not explored. 4
The Report contains a good amount of material dealing with the spe-
cialized field of real estate bonds, where abuses have been patent. As these
cases are not at all representative of corporate indentures generally,3
ment banking house may be impossible to establish. It should be observed, however, that
a cause of action against a corporate trustee might often be of greater value to a security
holder than a similar cause of action against an investment banker.
58. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended by 48 Sr. 881 (1934) and 49 STAm. 557
(1935), 15 U. S. C. c. 2A (Supp. 1937).
59. 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. c. 2B (1934).
60. Securities Act, § 12. See McCollom, supra note 20, at 1215.
61. Two instances cited to support the conclusions of the REronT involved a pros-
pectus that was incomplete or misleading: Hazzard Y. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc.
57, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1936), and the Union Power Corporation bankruptcy,
pp. 18, 20, 55-57.
62. At p. 110.
63. The REPORT points out that these listing requirements "reach only the rather
limited classes of securities dealt in on such exchanges," and that they cannot be made
too exacting without risk that issuers will prefer to keep their securities off the exchanges
in order to be free to choose their own forms of indentures and trustees. Id. at 110.
64. One excellent suggestion is, however, included in the lREronr, although not re-
flected in the Barkley Bill. At page 31, xvith reference to assuring that proceeds of
indenture securities will be applied in accordance wvith the indenture's terms, the REronr
states: "The trustee's hand might be strengthened in this connection by requiring the
filing of certificates of proper application of proceeds as supplements to registration under
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Poten-
tial liability thus created for misstatements in these certificates would tend to discourage
improper application of proceeds."
Another respect in which the Barkley Bill is not in accord ith the Rrrormr is the
matter of the trustee's powers. The REroRT concedes that the modern indenture generally
gives a trustee sufficient powers and need not in that respect be amplified. Id., at 42, 61.
But compare § 302 (a) (2) of the Bill
65. See the justified criticism of McCollom, supra note 20, at 1216, 1218-1219, 1227,
which points out that the important institutional trustees have very few real estate in-
dentures.
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they should be segregated"0 and not used as a basis for conclusions
affecting the whole of modern indenture practice.
All these factors deserve further consideration than the Report accords
before the nature and advantages of additional legislation can be properly
weighed. Finally, attention should be forcefully directed to the Report's
dominant characteristic: it is concerned solely with the investor's interests.
It contains no mention of the interest of the issuer, which is fundamental.
It pays scant attention to the desirability of maintaining a free flow of
capital and the remarkable effectiveness of indentures as a means of
sound and proper financing. These are, of course, primary considera-
tions, entitled to greatest weight in judging the merits of remedial legis-
lation. Their neglect in the Report emphasizes that it is rather a brief
in a special cause than an adequate survey of the present situation.
These comments upon the Report are not tendered, however, in a
hostile spirit. They stress the negative aspect because in its positive con-
tributions the Report speaks eloquently for itself. A powerful brief can
energize immediate corrective activity, where a more judicious document
might fail, and in this the Report, even taken without the Barkley Bill,
has been a signal success.07 It proves conclusively that trustees have been
often lax at times of serious defaults when action to protect security
holders was imperative. Conflicts of interest, to a degree undoubtedly
damaging and close to the border of fraud, are strikingly revealed, and one
may be certain that far more cases than appear in its pages are matter of
common knowledge in financial centers. Weakness in indenture pro-
visions, particularly negative pledge clauses and provisions for the release
and substitution of security, is fully demonstrated. Although some of
the subjects the Report touches are controversial, in these important niat-
ters improvement is clearly to be desired, and the only question is the
best method by which it may be obtained. The conclusion of the Report
is that the provisions of trust indentures should be controlled by federal
law, which should also prescribe qualifications for trustees, require them
to be active, and hold them to a high fiduciary standard. The Barkley
Bill is the full and logical expression of this theory.
THE BARKLEY BILL
In the form in which it has now been introduced in the Seventy-Sixth
Congress, 8 the Barkley Bill represents the original measure, prepared
66. New York has dealt with them separately in the "Streit Law." N. Y. RuAL
PRoP. LAW, §§ 124-129, 130 (a)-(!), added by Laws, 1936, c. 900.
67. See Kuhn, The Securities Act and Its Effect Upon the Instiltutional Investor
(1937) 4 LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoB. 80, 82.
68. This article deals with the present House bill, H. R. 2191, 76th Cong., 1st Sesm.,
except where specific reference to earlier drafts is made. Copies of the present Senate
bill, S.477, are not available at the time of writing, but it is understood to be identical
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largely by the Securities and Exchange Commission, modified" as a
result of the committee hearings in both the Senate and the House and
through frequent informal conferences in which representatives of insur-
ance companies, investment bankers, mutual savings banks, commercial
banks and institutional trustees have participated. 0 The present form has
received qualified approval or pledges of non-opposition from representa-
tives of each of these groups 71 with the apparent exception of the invest-
ment bankers, who have expressed strong opposition."2 There is no record,
at least in the published transcripts of the committee hearings, that issuers,
either individually or through associations, have made their opinion known
in any way.
with the measure introduced in the House. The Barklcy Bill passed through four
committee prints in the Senate of the 75th Congress. A hearing was held, after
Committee Print No. 2 was issued, on June 9, 15, 22 and 29, 1937, before the
Securities and Exchange subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banling and
Currency. Hearings Before the Securities and Exchange Sublcommittee of the Cominttee
on Banking and Currency of the Senate, on S. 4344. 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937). The
bill was reported favorably to the Senate April 19, 1938 [Report No. 1619, Calendar No.
1695, 75th Cong. 3d Sess.] and was simultaneously introduced in the House. A hearing
before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
was held April 25, 1938. Hearings Before a Subcommitiee of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, on II. R. o.q2. 75th Cong. 3d Sess.
(1938). Records of these hearings will be hereinafter referred to as Sm.,%Tz HLrnac
and HousE HEARING, and Report No. 1619 in the Senate as SENATE PEWIrr.
69. The most important of the changes made in the Senate committee, 75th Congress,
was the elimination of provisions barring debenture and certain other trustees from being
at any time short-term creditors of the issuing companies. See Committee Print No. 2,
§ 7(b) (6), reprinted in SENA-E HEARiNG 7. H. R. 2191 of the 76th Congress differs
from the final form of the bills introduced in the preceding Congress mainly in matters
of detail, the more important substantive changes being described infra in notes 102,
116, 123(10) and 128. H. R. 2191 presents the measure as an amendment to the Securities
Act of 1933, to be Title III of that Act (as the Lea Bill, H. R. 6963, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937) was planned to be), and its sections are numbered 301-325. The changes in
substance from the final form of the bills of the Seventy-Fifth Congress are to be found
in §§306(d); 308(b)(4), (5) and (9); 308(c); 310(b); 312(a), (e)(1) and (2);
315(b) ; and 316.
70. SENATE HEARING 17, 87, 88, 89; HOUSE HLURNlG 17, 58.
71. HOUSE HEARixG 17-18, 43-47, 58-61; SENA,,TE HEmArG 149. See also "Aims,
Purposes and Philosophy of the Barkley Bill," an address by Edmund Burke, Jr., Assist-
ant Director of the Reorganization Division, Securities and Exchange Commission, de-
livered at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association, Cleveland, Ohio, July
26, 1938. W,,hether any of the assenting organizations mas in a position to engage in
vigorous dispute with the bill's supporters at the time may be open to some question.
When first introduced in the Senate the bill was critically received by the Bar. Report
of the Committee on Administration of the Bankruptcy Lay., Chicago Bar Association,
January 14, 1938; Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation, Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, March 1, 1938; see Posner, The Proposed Federal Meas-
lre to Regulate Trust Indentures (1937) 71 U. S. L. REv. 394. Comments of individual
lawyers on later drafts will be found in SEN.TE HFXnmN, 94-105, 103-122, 156-162; House-
HEAmXG 76-80.
72. House HEAPRIG 72-75, S1-91.
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The bill provides for direct control of the terms of the indenture.
Through that control it seeks to assure responsible trustees, free from
conflicts of interest and urged to constant vigilance by imminent lia-
bilities. The bill extends in general to every indenture under which the
ordinary forms of securities shall be publicly issued in the future,"3 both
new indentures and existing indentures,74 except those already subject
to some governmental regulation,"0 and compliance is enforced by
barring the use of the mails or any facility of interstate transportation
for the sale or delivery of any security issued under an indenture which
is not approved."0 The requirement of prior approval, or "qualification",
of an indenture is comparable to registration under the Securities Act
of 1933, and the two measures are also dovetailed in various ways,
77
but their mutual resemblances are superficial. Procedurally they differ
in that no "stop orders" are possible under the Barkley Bill, and once
an indenture is "qualified" by receiving the Commission's approval the
jurisdiction of the Commission ends except for the matter of requiring
reports.78 In substance the two differ fundamentally, for while the
Securities Act requires only a full public disclosure of the contract and
circumstances under which the securities are to be issued, the Barkley
Bill takes charge of the contract itself and prescribes what its terms may
and may not be. It is this new extension of theory which gives the
Barkley Bill its particular importance.
A preliminary section of several paragraphs introduces the bill. This
refers to the Commission's Report, sets out and describes as "widespread"
73. The bill applies to notes, bonds, debentures or evidences of indebtedness, and
also certificates of interest or participation in, temporary certificates for, or guarantees
of any of these types. § 304 (a) (1). The bill does not apply to sales consummated within
six months of its enactment [§304(a)(3)], and the Commission may in its discretion
exempt indentures under which securities not exceeding $250,000 in total are to be
issued. § 304(c).
74. Further issues under already existing indentures shall, in case of proved hardship,
be wholly or in some respects exempted by the Commission. § 304(d).
75. The exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933 of governments, municipals, bnzil
securities, certain railroad securities, securities of charitable institutions, insurance pol-
icies, etc., are repeated in the Barkley Bill, except for securities issued in exchange for
others of the same issuer, and securities issued under a plan approved by a court. § 304 (a)
(4); SENATE REPORT 9-10.
76. Section 305 (a). Under § 305 (b) no Securities Act registration statement will be-
come effective as to securities issued under an indenture which violates the bill's pro-
visions.
77. E.g., each provides a twenty-day period for the Commission's examination, with
automatic approval at the expiration of that time if no adverse action is taken. Barkley
Bill, § 306(c) ; Securities Act of 1933, as amended, § 8(a). Filing fees under the Barkley
Bill are to be deductible from the fees payable under the Securities Act. § 306 (b) of the
Bill.
78. This is an exception which may have considerable importance. See note 123,
infra, subsection (8).
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the various causes of trouble which the Report discusses, and concludes
with a statement that the policy of the measure, which shall govern its
interpretation, is "to meet the problems and eliminate the abuses" listed."'
Passing the question whether or not this introductory section overstates
the case against the present-day indenture,"0 it deserves attention because
here, if anywhere, are limits imposed upon the Commission's right to
exercise discretionary power, a subject which later will be discussed in
detail.
Apart from the sections containing definitions, penalties, and various
matters of procedure, none of which requires especial comment, the body
of the Barkley Bill enumerates a great number of points of control in an
indenture, which may be grouped into those where the control provided
is specific and mandatory and those where it is indefinite or left to the
Commission's discretion. As different considerations apply to each group,
they will be taken separately, the specific provisions first. The most im-
portant of these establish qualifications for indenture trustees and provide
for the elimination of exculpatory clauses.
TRUSTEES: QUALIFICATIONS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
There is a dexterous approach to the troublesome problems of irre-
sponsible trustees and trustees with conflicting interests. Instead of asking
direct governmental supervision over trustee activities, as has been occa-
sionally suggested,"' the Barkley Bill requires the indenture itself to set
out in terms what the trustee must be and what relationships are pro-
hibited to it, with a stipulation that if a forbidden relationship should
at any time exist the trustee must either correct the situation or resign
within ninety days.8 2 This device permits restriction of the bill largely
to the form and provisions of the indenture. To assure responsibility,
every indenture affected must provide for at least one institutional
trustee,83 and there may be a requirement in the indenture, if the Com-
mission feels it necessary, that this trustee must maintain at all times
a combined capital and surplus in such sum as the Commission may
79. On the extension of the public utility concept to all indenture financing, see
Green, Trend of Decisions and Legislation Affecting the Corporate Truslee (1937) 15
TAX MAG. 704, 707.
80. There is serious doubt whether abuses are, in fact, at all as general as the Bill
and the REroRT state. It is generally agreed that the best trustees now maintain a high
fiduciary standard. See McCollom, siupra note 20, at 1212-1214; SENxT HEARIa 29-30,
149-150, 157; HousE HE.ARxG 19, 21, 58, 76, 82-84; SENATE r 0. EMT 1.
81. See Burke, supra note 71; SENATE HEARnG 43, 47; HousE HEuMNGa 37.
82. §308(b).
83. § 308(a) (1). This would ordinarily be a commercial bank or trust company. Al-
lowance is made for additional trustees because in some instances an individual trustee,
or trustees resident in different states, would be needed to meet requirements of state law.
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determine. '" An obligation to have an institutional trustee for all issues
of any importance will meet with general favor, although the additional
stipulation may be unnecessary.85
The provisions designed to eradicate conflicts of interest are less satis-
factory. The bill requires every indenture of a particular obligor to have
a separate institutional trustee, except in a few cases where no conflict
would result.8" This may put an obligor with several outstanding issues to
some inconvenience or embarrassment to find an available high class
trustee for a new indenture issue, 7 but this is not a very serious objec-
tion, and the rule has precedent in its favor."8 The significant difficulty
is encountered in the sections devoted to forestalling conflicts resulting
from common officers or security interests. Here the definitions of what
constitutes a fatal conflict of interest are worked out with a particularity
that is bewildering.8 9 It is obvious that the authors of the bill, convinced
84. § 308(a) (2). Chairman Douglas stated to the Senate subcommittee that he sup-
posed that the inclusion of this requirement in an indenture would be insisted upon only
in very exceptional cases. SENATE HFXRING 51.
85. The comment has frequently been made that substantial trustees are sought by
issuers and underwriters to add prestige to the issue. See supra note 38. It is, however,
conceivable that persons anxious to evade these restrictions would resort to the formation
and use of trustee institutions which would have no substantial assets. On the other hand,
a later Commission, anxious to favor metropolitan banks, could use this discretionary
power to divert trusteeship from local banks to a few selected institutions.
86. The exceptions are (1) where the second indenture is secured by securities
issued under the first indenture, or vice versa; (2) where the issuer is a real estate com-
pany with substantially all its assets mortgaged, and the indentures cover distinct parcels
of realty; and (3) where the issuer can prove to the Commission that no material con-
flict is in prospect. § 308(b) (1).
87. This point was raised at the Senate subcommittee's hearing, and the need for this
provision questioned in view of the common practice of trustees to resign from one of
two conflicting positions when a conflict develops. SENATE HEARING 115-116. See also
Stetson, supra note 6, at 20, 73; Posner, supra note 13, at 792; McCollom, supra note 20,
at 1221. Resignation at the time of a default, however, may be of little assistance to se-
curity holders.
88. One of the Stock Listing Requirements of the New York Stock Exchange is
that there shall be a separate trustee for each indenture under which different bond issues
of the same obligor are issued. This trustee may not be an officer or director of the
issuer, or a bank or corporation either having as executive officer an officer of the issuing
corporation, or controlled by, or controlling, the issuing corporation. Another require-
ment is that any listed issue must have a substantial and experienced institutional trustee.
C. C. H. 1937 Stock Exch. Regulation Serv. ff 11617; Stetson, supra note 6, at 71-74.
89. These rules are set out in § 308(b). They are too numerous and intricate for
any condensed summary to be accurate. Among the more important are these: that no
director or executive officer of a trustee may be a director, partner or employee of an
underwriter; that there may be only one common director (a "listening post") between
a trustee and an obligor, unless the trustee has ten or more directors in which case
another common director is permitted; that a trustee is disqualified if it owns five per
cent of the voting securities of an obligor or of any corporation which, to its knowledge,
owns ten per cent of the voting securities of an obligor. It should be observed that since
1933 the Banking Acts have required the separation of commercial and investment bank-
ing. REPoRT 101.
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of the dangers of influence being exerted on a trustee by an underwriter
or obligor under the indenture through common directors or officers,
stock ownership, or interest in some common intermediary, have system-
atically undertaken to sever or attenuate every conceivable connection
which might draw the trustee away from its duty. Any indenture, to
be qualified by the Commission, must embody these complex rules entire.
The multiplicity of these rules, their artificiality, and the low percentage
of security ownership required to disqualify a trustee are characteristics
which invite criticism. 0  Also in their present form they will in certain
cases produce anomalous consequences. 1 It seems probable that one result
of placing this whole code in effect would be to force trusteeships out
of small town and city banks, where connections with local enterprises
are frequently found, into the metropolitan banks, an increased centraliza-
tion which would not be healthy. 2 Then the larger the trustee bank, the
more prodigious would be the task of checking and bookkeeping, and the
less the likelihood of complete compliance." Yet it is hard not to be
90. See Posner, supra note 71, at 397; SENATE HARmNG 117, 134-136; Housu HErAn-
ING 63-65.
91. For instance, a trustee is disqualified if five per cent of its voting securities is
owned individually, or ten per cent is owned collectively, by the obligor or by any
directors, partners or executive officers of the obligor (with one inconsequential excep-
tion), or if five per cent of such securities is owned either individually or collectively by
an underwriter or by any of its directors, partners or executive officers. § 30S(b) (5).
If the trustee has voting securities which are sold in the open market, some of these
persons, by buying close to the forbidden amount, could influence a trustee by threat of
disqualification.
Again, these rules provide [§ 308(b) (9)] that a trustee may hold in a representative
capacity, such as executor or administrator, personal trustee or conservator, twenty-five
per cent (and in some cases fifty per cent) of an obligor's securities, of which the eefi-
cial ownership of five per cent would disqualify. If there is a default for thirty days in
principal or interest payments under the main indenture, however, only five per cent of
such securities may be held in any capacity. A default might, therefore, require the
trustee to sell out individual trusts in a falling market at severe loss, or resign as
indenture trustee at the time when its services would be most urgently needed.
92. The possibility of this is implicit in the statement of Chairman Douglas [SENAva
HEAI NG 55], and has been commented upon by others. See, e.g., SENATE HEAra 193-
194; HOUSE HEAR.NG 69.
Comparable restrictions were to be found in the Lea Bill [H. R. 6963, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess., Committee Print No. 2 (1937)] upon the membership of protective committees.
They were so numerous and exclusive in that measure that they might have emasculated
committees if not entirely prevented their formation. Dodd, stpra note 42, at 254-255;
Laporte, Changes in Corporate Reorganization Procedure Proposed by the Chandlcr and
Lea Bills (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 672, 681-6,88. The Lea Bill was not acted upon by
the 75th Congress; at the time of writing it has not been introduced in the 76th Congress,
although its introduction has been forecast.
93. Housa HEARiXG 70. It does not appear, however, that the difficulties of bo !-
keeping would necessarily be insurmountable. The final judgment of the American
Bankers Association, as expressed to the House subcommittee by the respective chairmen
of its committees on Federal Legislation and on Mortgage Trusteeships, was that although
it did not believe the bill -as necessary, it considered it to be "workable, practicable,
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sympathetic with this network of restrictions, the end in view is so ob-
viously desirable; and all these criticisms might be dismissed if there
were not the more fundamental objection that a much simpler method
might be more effective.
The existence of common officers, or common interests, is of course
only a cause and not the evil itself. What must be prevented is the dis-
suasion of a trustee from the performance of its duties by some adverse
interest. It is clearly impossible to root out every such connection; the
important factors of family relationships, friendship and unwritten under-
standings all remain untouched in the Barkley Bill. Since large areas of
influence will inevitably lie outside any list of prohibitions, it would seem
preferable to turn from this extremely detailed regulation, with its train
of minor difficulties, and to concentrate directly upon the wrongful result.
There are ways in which a more direct attack may be made. I f cacti
trustee were subject to a formal requirement that it register with some
governmental agency, and the registration could be revoked upon ade-
quate proof that a conflict of interest had caused it to be derelict in its
duty, normal self-interest should work for the solution of this problem.0
Again, where a trustee benefits itself at the expense of security holders,
it may well be held liable under existing law, certainly to the extent of
the benefit received." If.this liability were made definite by statute, and
double damages provided for, a decrease in compromising connections
would certainly follow.
Another provision of the Barkley Bill in fact follows this liability
principle, without the punitive accessory. This is the "preferential col-
lection" section," so called because of its similarity to the rule govern-
ing preferences in bankruptcy, which deals with the circumstance where
a trustee, as banker, is a short-term creditor of an obligor tinder the
indenture at the time of a default. All indentures subject to the bill must
provide that in this situation any payments made to or additional col-
lateral received by the trustee within the four months preceding the
default shall be segregated and divided pro rata"T with the holders of
indenture securities. If the loan was made during that period the original
and livable." House HEARING 45-47. Little attention was paid to this mechanical prob-
lem. Trustee banks, of course, could expect fair compensation for this additional work,
The largely increased fees which this bill throughout promises institutional trustees is
an inducement to them, although correspondingly discouraging to issuers.
94. This is suggested by an alternative statute outlined to the House subcomnittee.
HousE HEARING 79; see infra, p. 571.
95. See Housa HEARING 70. The pressure of such a liability is indicated by a case
stated in the REPORT, at 84-86, where an indenture trustee which had strengthened its
creditor position by correspondingly weakening the obligor restored the transferred col-
lateral at the demand of the obligor's receivers. The usual instance would involve bad
faith, or be a direct impairment of the indenture security, and this would overcome the
protection of an exculpatory clause.
96. § 309.
97. A complicated formula to ensure equality of division is prescribed.
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collateral also is forfeited to similar treatment unless the trustee can
positively establish that at the time of the loan transaction it had no
reasonable cause to anticipate such an early default. This is a residue of
much more stringent restrictions in earlier drafts, to which vigorous
objection had been expressed." It will discourage a trustee's making
"rescue loans" to help an obligor in financial trouble, and to that extent
may sometimes hasten bankruptcy or make it inescapable when it might
have been avoided. 9 But it should be effective to block off one clear
conflict, where the trustee can secure its own creditor interest best by
negleding to take steps for the bondholders.Y" This provision does not
hamper the trustee's banking function unduly, and it appears as an in-
novation in which the chance for harm is outweighed by the possibilities
of advantage. An extension of its theory to other conflicts might be
profitable.
THE BAN ON EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
Provisions intended to relieve an indenture trustee of liability or re-
sponsibility for action take many forms.10' There are the ever-present
exculpatory clauses, both general and specific; clauses entitling a trustee
to rely conclusively upon certificates or opinions of experts; clauses per-
mitting a trustee to be considered ignorant of defaults unless notified by
security holders, usually in a certain percentage; and clauses justifying
a trustee's refusal to take action unless first indemnified against liability
or expense and requested to act by holders of a certain percentage of the
securities. These provisions have tended to become standard in the modem
indenture; and under the Barkley Bill all of them, with but one excep-
tion,10 2 would be outlawed.10 3
98. See supra note 69; SENATE BEAnIN 117-119, 125-126, 147, 158.
99. See HousE HEAnING 49, 70.
100. See the instances where such conflicts were present, in compromising circum-
stances, as described in the REPoRT, at 83-97.
101. See supra p. 540.
102. See § 312(e) (2). The bill also permits an indenture to contain provisions protect-
ing a trustee from liability for any error of judgment made in good faith by a responsible
officer "unless it shall be proved that the trustee was negligent in ascertaining the per-
tinent facts," [§312(e) (3)] and provisions authorizing the holders of a majority of the
indenture securities to direct the method and place of conducting legal proceedings, with
protection for the trustee in following the directions. § 312(e) (4). Such provisions
would not afford appreciable if any protection beyond that of equity and common law.
There is a new subsection in H. R. 2191, not appearing in the earlier bills, to the
effect that the indenture may include a provision "that, prior to default, the trustee shall
be liable for the performance of only such duties as shall be specifically set out in the
indenture." § 312(e) (1). This does not relieve from negligence liability, but it may
have some effect in forestalling the application of the theory of "implied" duties. See
supra note 27. Clauses of this general character, not limited to the period before default,
are common enough in modern indentures, but if they were to ttand alone, without the
usual accompaniment of exculpatory provisions, they might have greater weight.
103. § 312(e). There is no section which specifically bars indemnity provisions and the
"ostrich clause," but it is evident throughout the sections dealing with the powers and
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The single exception is left a very uncertain one. The bill would per-
mit indentures to include provisions authorizing the trustee to rely con-
clusively, as to facts and matters of opinion, upon certificates and opinions
of attorneys, accountants and experts; but this right of reliance upon
other parties is to be qualified in the indenture by "such requirements as
to independence and qualifications and the exercise by the trustee of
reasonable care in their selection or approval, and subject to such other
terms and conditions, as the Commission may deem necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." Since
there can be, practically, no appeal from the Commission's decision on
these questions,10 4 it is apparent that under the bill reliance upon certifi-
cates would be largely a matter of grace rather than of right.
These protective provisions are to be supplanted in indentures by spe-
cific requirements that the trustee serve the security holders actively at
all times, in accordance with the strictest fiduciary standards. The exact
measure of a trustee's obligation before a default is left in some doubt, 01
but the standard after default, intended to be the highest possible, 10  is
set out in the bill as the indenture must state it.
The effect of this part of the Barkley Bill is most difficult to calculate.
As is understandable, it is regarded with greatest apprehension by officers
of some trustee banks who see, in the prospect of verdicts running into
millions, the fate of banks and their depositors being constantly decided
by the chance and the emotion of a jury trial.'" 7 At the other end of the
scale may be found occasional comments in decisions indicating that a
general exculpatory clause adds little if anything to the protection which
the courts themselves would cast about an honest trustee, from which the
inference is possible that discarding such provisions would not result in
drastic change.""8 The actuality lies between these two extremes.
duties of trustees that such provisions will not be permissible unless the enacted bill
should be administered contrary to its present interpretation and tenor. HouSE HUAI-
ING 21; see also § 312(a), (b).
104. See infra, p. 563.
105. The trustee is to have such duties as "are consistent with the duties and obliga-
tions which a prudent man would assume and perform prior to such a default if he were
trustee under such an indenture . . . ." [§ 312 (a) ] ; see infra, pp. 557-560.
106. §312(c). "The indenture to be qualified shall contain provisions requiring the
indenture trustee to exercise in case of default (as such term is defined in the indenture)
such of the rights and powers vested in it by the indenture, and to use the same degree
of care and skill in their exercise, as a prudent mar would exercise under the circum-
stances if he were a fiduciary and had the degree of skill which the indenture trustee
has, or which, at the time of the offering of the indenture securities, the indenture trustee
represents itself as having, as indenture trustee, whichever is the higher." The purpose
of this elaborate circumlocution is, evidently, to push the standard of care up as high as
it can possibly go. Anything further would make the trustee an insurer.
107. SENATE HFARIN4G 124-128, 139-140, 146. HousE HEARING 51-52, 61, 66.
108. See Riker v. Alsop, 27 Fed. 251, 259 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) ; Watson v. Scran-
ton Trust Co., 240 Pa. 507, 512, 87 AtI. 845, 847 (1913) ; Cassels, The Effect of Indem-
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Since a trustee's liability will be directly related to the extent of its
duties, this subject should be divided into the time before a serious default
and the time after, for each period has its particular demands. Once a
default of real consequence has occurred, the obligation of a trustee is
perfectly clear. It must spare no reasonable effort to make certain that
the default is properly cured or, if not, that the security is fully realized
upon for the benefit of the holders of the indenture securities. This basic
duty of the trustee would probably not be altered materially under the
Barkley Bill, although a few additional powers might be given, and all
excuse for inaction would be removed. Obviously no one but the trustee
is or can be expected to be in a position to act effectively when the
emergency arrives. Security holdeirs are usually scattered and unorgan-
ized, and their organization, when it is perfected, may not be adequately
equipped and is seldom completely representative. To allow each individual
holder of a bond or debenture to bring his own suit would result in con-
fusion. The original business intention was to place the trustee in its
focal position for this purpose, among others, and no convincing reason
appears why a trustee should not be under a liability for ordinary negli-
gence in the performance of its most important active function. Little
would be gained, however, by raising the standard still further, as the
Barkley Bill seeks to do;1" this added imposition seems confusing and
unnecessary. 10
It has been pointed out"' that one result of withdrawing the protection
of exculpatory clauses would be to oblige the trustee to enter and fore-
close or to institute reorganization proceedings immediately upon a de-
fault, to escape any imputation of negligence or chance of liability for
loss attributable to its delay. Very likely this would follow, and also there
is little question that a trustee's willingness to forego the strictest mea-
sures, to give the obligor a chance to right itself after a default in interest
or principal payments, has on occasions in the past been directly instru-
mental in avoiding bankruptcies and consequently highly beneficial to
security holders. This occasional benefit will be lost, if liability for negli-
gence is imposed, and the only answer to this objection is that a trustee's
willingness to wait has at times worked the other way. But the argument
brings out one point of great importance; if the system should be so
changed that teclmical and relatively trivial defaults might precipitate
entry or foreclosure," indentures would be such dangerous instruments
nity Clauses upon Trustees Liability for Wilful Default and Areglect (1899) 9 Ccx.
L. T. 1.
109. § 312(c).
110. SENATE HEARING 114-115; HOUSE HEAriNG 51.
111. SENATE HEARING 127-128; HOUSE HrING 51-54, 56, 66.
112. An effort to prevent this result is evident in the sections of the bill giving the
Commission power to determine what shall constitute a default, what particular defaults
shall require notice to security holders, and rights and powers of the trustee in respect
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that their use might be abandoned by issuers. As any default at all would
appear alarming to a trustee liable for negligence, there is persuasive
reason for restricting that liability to the period after an important default.
Other considerations lead to the same conclusion.
The typical modern indenture contains not only a varied list of obliga-
tions of the trustee, to be performed from time to time, but also numerous
intricate covenants of the obligor. During the normal life of the trust
characteristic duties of the trustee, already referred to, are to authorize
the substitution of security or to release it for sale, to authenticate and
deliver additional indenture securities and to ascertain the proper appli-
cation of their proceeds. Substitution, release and the further issuance
of securities are acts usually permitted by the indenture only if certain
conditions are satisfied. The condition precedent most frequently found
is that the issuer shall have performed all of its covenants to that time.
There are often special conditions for particular acts: substituted security
may be required to have a certain value ;113 the right to have more securi-
ties issued under the indenture may depend upon the acquisition of new
property or construction of new facilities in accordance with detailed speci-
fications.1 4 If the trustee were to be held personally responsible for seeing
that such conditions were met, it would have to exercise a high degree
of supervision over the issuer's business. To ascertain whether or not
a default existed somewhere might require under some indentures 15 a
thorough analysis of the obligor's capital structure and present position,
including an appraisal of its assets. Indentures now short-cut these enor-
mous complications by permitting a trustee to rely upon certificates and
opinions of experts or officers of the obligor, and exculpatory clauses
protect the trustee, at least to some extent, in this reliance.
The Barkley Bill would work a complete change. The right to obtain
protection through reliance upon certificates would surely be restricted
and might for all practical purposes be substantially eliminated.11 As
to foreclosure and sale. § 312(b), (d) (1), (d) (2) (c). The trustee's right to petition for
instructions is probably too limited to be of any practical assistance here. See Posner,
supra note 6, at 203; McCollom, supra note 20, at 1209; Hill v. Moors, 224 Mass. 163,
165, 112 N. E. 641, 642 (1916); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Smith, 263 N. Y.
292, 295, 189 N. E. 222, 223 (1934).
113. When the substituted security is to be stock or bonds of another corporation, the
earnings or assets of such corporation may have to equal a certain figure, and the formula
of computation may be very involved. See REPORT 16, 19, 27.
114. See Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 519, 65 N. E. 499
(1902); REPORT 27.
115. For example, indentures obliging the issuer to maintain a certain ratio of quick
assets to liabilities, or to refrain from encumbering a certain percentage of its property.
Clauses such as these are commonly used to strengthen the credit of unsecured debentures.
Stetson, supra note 6, at 66-67; DEWING, A STUDY OF CORPORATION SECURITIES, TtI
NATURE AND USES IN FINANcE (1934) 314.
116. It is interesting to observe in this connection that although H. R. 10292, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) would have permitted a trustee to rely in some circumstances
[Vol. 48: 533
SECURITIES AND THE BARKLEY BILL
this right is curtailed, the trustee's duties become correspondingly in-
creased; if it can no longer depend upon the word of an accountant or
a company officer, it must itself, whenever called upon to act, make an
independent investigation to determine whether the specified conditions
precedent to its action have been completely satisfied. The item of
expense involved in a single investigation of this sort might be very
substantial, and if such investigations were necessary at intervals at all
corresponding in frequency to the present use of certificates, the expense
alone, charged to the issuer, would be a heavy burden upon it. There
would be another burden upon the issuer as well, that of the trustee's
constant supervision and interference. A careful trustee, acting under
the provisions of the Barkley Bill, would probably feel obliged to main-
tain close contact with an obligor's business affairs, for fear that if some
situation affecting the indenture escaped its attention the liability for
negligence, imposed throughout this new activity, would expose it to risk
of suit and possibly large damages. An issuer might find that in many
business decisions the trustee's approval would practically be necessary,
and its word final.
The work of an indenture trustee must be kept within reasonable bounds
if this method of financing is not to become so expensive and cumber-
some as to be useless. The present custom of permitting reliance upon
opinions and certificates, with the addition of exculpatory clauses for what
additional protection they offer, is far from perfect, yet it is preferable
to the alternative the Barkley Bill presents. It would be an improvement
if certificates of independent experts could be assured,"'7 but it is diffi-
cult to see any practicable way in which reliance upon certificates can to
any considerable extent be displaced. Nor is the extension of the trustee's
responsibility, by eliminating protective devices, a remedy which may be
too freely administered. The balance favors leaving the trustee with his
present protection against negligence litigation unless and until a serious
default occurs.118
There is another important reason why a trustee's liability should not
be so largely extended. It is obvious that removing all protection from a
trustee, as well as greatly increasing its duties, will necessitate the charg-
ing of far higher fees for the acceptance and execution of the trust.
At present the ordinary indenture trustee has no need of a sizeable staff
of accountants, appraisers and engineers, and the fee it charges is rela-
tively very small indeed, commensurate with the ministerial character
upon certificates of officers of the obligor, that possibility is elimilnated in the present
bill.
117. The meticulous requirements suggested and authorized by § 312(e) (2) appear to
go much too far.
118. This is the view of Mr. Posner. SENATE HLRNG 113.
19391
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of most of its functions." 9 How much of an increase would be needed
to compensate for all the added responsibilities contemplated is wholly
speculative, but it could not fail to be a very substantial one. 120  This
emphasizes a characteristic which the Barkley Bill shares with other
regulatory legislation, that it will bear hardest on the small or struggling
issuer, without much margin in the flotation of its securities, while the
well entrenched corporation would feel its incidence less. If the liability
for negligence were restricted to the time after a significant default, the
increase in fees would be far less marked, and the transition would be
less difficult, not only for trustees but for issuers, whose interests deserve
much more attention than they appear to have received.
AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Overshadowing in importance all the rest of the Barkley Bill are the
sections which confer upon the Securities and Exchange Commission
virtually unrestricted authority to prescribe most of the terms of the cor-
porate indenture. The contemplated transfer of power over private con-
tract from private hands to a federal agency is so complete as to provoke
a general controversy of political theory having, however, only secondary
importance to the problems of the trust indenture.
119. A corporate trustee in New York City, acting as trustee for a $10,000,000 in-
denture issue of 4 per cent 20-year mortgage bonds of $1,000 denomination, would charge,
for the initial and final services of acceptance, certification of temporary bonds (in large
denominations) and definitive bonds, cremating the bonds and payment of principal,
approximately $9,000. Its annual fee for normal services in connection with the issue
would be $500, and if it acted as paying agent there would be an additional annual charge
of $1,000. Cremation of all coupons would add $200 annually, and for other services in
connection with holding stock and bonds as collateral, sinking fund, conversion, registra-
tion, executing supplemental indentures, etc., small specific fees would be charged, Cor-
porate Fiduciaries Association of New York City, Schedule of Fees, November 8, 1933.
The statement of Justice Rosenman in Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57,
287 N. Y. Supp. 591 (Sup. Ct. 1936) that the trustee's fee was "grotesquely exorbitant
in view of the negligible services performed" was colored by the circumstances of that
case and is not generally applicable. By way of comparison, though not as a criterion,
the statutory fee of a personal trustee in New York for managing a trust of mixed prop-
erty of $10,000,000 principal value, yielding 4 per cent, would be $200,020 plus an annual
charge of $8,020. Ibid. In Boston the comparable charges for the indenture trustceship
would total substantially the same as those of a New York trustee, but for the personal
trust the trustee's fee would be $105,000 plus an annual charge of $24,000. In Philadel-
phia the indenture trustee would charge somewhat less for similar services, and the per-
sonal trust fee would be $204,000 plus an annual charge of $12,000. See Schedule of Fees
for Personal Trust Services and Services to Corporations i; Pennsylvania, effective
December 9, 1933. A schedule of comparative fees is annexed to the RErORT as Appen-
dix B.
120. See Stetson, supra note 6, at 52; McCollom, supra note 20, at 1204-1205, 1227-
1228; REPORT 69-70; SENATE HEARING 139, 160; HouSE HEARING 52, 68.
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The reasoning which led to fixing the bill in this form is simple to
follow.' -1 Briefly, it is that the faults of the modern indenture pervade
every part, and if outlawed in one place or form they might well recur
in another; that any set of rigid rules would be impracticable, because
indentures should and do vary widely to meet individual requirements;
that the investors, who have *borne the consequent losses, are not in a
position to exert any real influence; and that therefore an arm of govern-
ment must be endowed with flexible powers, as a representative of the
investors, to correct defects in indentures wherever they may occur. In
outlining these powers it was found desirable, in view of the omnipresent
possibility of defective or stultifying provisions, to have them cover prac-
tically the whole substance of the indenture. Although the intention was
that in practice these powers would be exercised only in part or occa-
sionally, a broad original definition was needed to insure an adequate
reserve for unforeseen contingencies. So far as possible, hnwever, it
was planned that the purely "business" features of the indenture contract
should be excluded from the sphere of governmental control.
The present form of the Barkley Bill shows the difficulty encountered
in attempting to restrain a measure built upon this logical basis. Changes
from the earlier drafts afford additional indications. 22  There is, of
course, no way of granting a power which is complete and all embracing,
yet limited by some assurance that it will be sparingly used. That assur-
ance may be implicit in the character of an administrator, but it is neces-
sary to look beyond individuals in analyzing this proposed law.
There can be no doubt as to the extraordinary extent of the Corn-
mission's powers under this bill. No indenture is to be acceptable for
qualification unless it contains ptovisions which the Commission "deems
adequate" prescribing the rights, duties and powers of the trustee, the
121. See, generally, SENATE REPORT and the exposition of Chairman Douglas before
the Congressional committees, SENATE HFARI-ZG 17-87; HouSE HnAu. o 16-43.
122. The first two committee prints, for example, provided that the Commission could
exclude from indentures any provisions "the elimination of which is necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or to prevent the circum-
vention or evasion of this Act" [§ 6(5)], and the phrase employed in connection with the
Commission's power to prescribe certain other groups of clauses was "The indenture to
be qualified shall contain such provisions as the Commission shall deem necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." [§ 7(m)]. In the third
committee print the first of these provisions was modified by dropping the word "or"
before "to prevent," and the second provision w,,as generally altered to "The indenture
to be qualified shall contain provisions which the Commission deems adequate, having
due regard to the public interest and the interest of investors." The present measure
eliminates from the first clause the words "or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors:' but makes no further alteration in the second provision.
[§§307(5), 312(d)]. These changes were clearly intended to limit the Commission's
discretionary power, but it is doubtful how much limitation was actually effected. See
also note 123(10) infra. A successful restriction is found in the present §316(a). See
infra note 128.
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obligor, and even the security holders in connection with almost every
subject which the modern indenture touches.123 On some of these sub-
123. The most important of these required provisions which the Commission has
the power to prescribe, in a form it considers appropriate, are those defining
(1) the trustee's duties after default, comprising the subjects of entry, foreclosure and
sale, obtaining judgment, appearance and intervention in judicial proceedings, filing
proofs of claim and calling meetings of security holders [§ 312(c), (d) (2)];
(2) the "rights, powers and remedies of the indenture security holders and the man-
ner in which and conditions upon which such rights, powers and remedies may be exer-
cised" [§ 314] ;
(3) the "qualifications, rights, powers and duties of paying agents" [§ 315(a)];
(4) restrictions and conditions upon the release and substitution of security, tihe
issuance of additional indenture securities, and satisfaction and discharge [§313]
(5) what shall constitute a default under the indenture [§ 312(d) (1)];
(6) the duty of the trustee to notify indenture security holders of such defaults as the
Commission considers of sufficient importance [§ 312(b)];
(7) requirements for compiling and keeping lists of indenture security holders, and
making these lists available to security holders upon conditions which the Commission
"deems not detrimental to the public interest or the interests of investors" [§ 311];
(8) requirements for such annual and other reports from the obligor and the trustee,
upon a great variety of subjects, as the Commission may from time to time prescribe by
rule and regulation, the reports to be transmitted or made available to security holders as
the Commission's rules may require [§ 310];
(9) restrictions upon the employment by the trustee of attorneys or experts having
possibly conflicting interests, and requirements as to independence and qualifications of
experts furnishing certificates [§§ 312(e) (2), 315(b) ] (see supra, p. 559) ; and
(10) The provisions prescribing the trustee's duties before default. These provisions
are, however, now given somewhat different treatment. The final form of the bill in
the 75th Congress would have required the indenture to impose upon the trustee such
duties before default "as the Commission deems consistent with the duties and obliga-
tions which a prudent man would assume and perform prior to such a default if lie
were trustee under such an indenture, including, without limitation, action in respect of
"(a) recordation, (b) the application of proceeds, (c) "the existence of or compliance
with" all conditions precedent to authentication and delivery, the release and substitution
of security, satisfaction and discharge, and "any other action by the trustee under the
indenture," and (d) "the performance by the obligor of such of its other obligations
under the indenture as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors" [§ 7(g)]. A theoretical restriction on the
scope of the Commission's discretion is established by the present bill, in which the
phrase "the Commission deems consistent" is replaced by "are consistent," the rest of
the section remaining unaltered [§312(a)]. Since the Commission in any event has
power to prescribe the form of these indenture provisions (see note 128, nlra), the
practical effect of this change may-be only to give a slightly better basis for an appeal
from the Commission's decision in the rare case where an appeal would be practicable,
Compare the grant of discretionary power to the Commission, to prescribe the ternis
of solicitations by committees, provided in the Lea Bill, H. R. 6968, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., Committee Print No. 2 (1937), supra note 92; Laporte, supra note 92, at 084-687.
The Lea Bill, the Chandler Act [52 STAT. 840, 11 U. S. C. § 1 (Supp. 1938)] and tile
Barkley Bill should be given joint consideration: all three extend administrative super-
vision or control over functions of business and share a purpose to make more strict
the standards of business conduct. See Weiner, The Securities and Exchange Conusson
and Corporate Reorganization (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 280, 286-288; Laporte, supra
note 92, at 673-674.
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jecti the Commission's power to create indenture clauses appears to be
altogether unlimited, unless by the indefinite influence of the introductory
section.124 On others identifying references of a very general sort are
found: for example, in one section the bill, in connection with the im-
portant acts of releasing or substituting property, issuing new securities
and satisfying the indenture, authorizes the imposition of "restrictions
and conditions which, in the light of the bargain of the parties, the Com-
mission deems adequate, having due regard to the public interest and
the interest of investors. ' 11 Phrases of this character, although dis-
closing a desire and effort to bound the Commission's discretion, ' have
little if any practical force. Should anything further be needed to perfect
the control of the Commission, it is supplied by two additional clauses,
one barring from indentures any provision which limits, qualifies or con-
flicts with any required provision or which should be eliminated to prevent
deception, circumvention or evasion, 127 and the other empowering the
Commission to determine the wording of any provision which an indenture
must contain' 2
The Commission's discretion in these important matters is not only
virtually unlimited, but it is also as a practical matter absolute and un-
reviewable. It is true that there is an appeal provision, 12 incorporating
the jealous rule of the Securities Act that on appeal the Commission's
findings of fact, if supported by evidence,' shall be final; but the bill
is so worded that the only question available for an appeal in connection
with these required provisions would be whether the Commission in any
case properly deemed the provision "adequate", "consistent" or "necessary
and appropriate" for the end in view. Constitutional questions might be
raised in the extreme case, but the delay in obtaining a final decision would
normally render such litigation useless.
The effect upon business of the actual administration of this part of
the bill is, of course, unpredictable. If the Securities and Exchange Com-
124. The provisions defining the rights of security holders seem to be entirely within
the Commission's discretion. See § 314.
125. § 313. 6ee also § 302(5). The reference to "the bargain of the parties" appears
for the first time in the third committee print. Before its inclusion Chairman Douglas
said that the Commission might "conceivably, in some cases, not allow substitution at all."
SExAT HEARING 39. The change was made to show a restriction of that power. Sc~Aa
HEAI G 213.
126. The words "having due regard to the public interest and the interest of in-
vestors" are repeated in substantially all the sections of the bill which confer discretionary
powers.
127. § 307(5).
128. §316(a). In earlier drafts of the bill this power extended to various provisions
"required or permitted to be included in an indenture," but in H. R. 2191 the words
"or permitted" do not appear.
129. §319(a).
130. Wholly insubstantial evidence, however, would presumably not suffice. Cf. Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (U. S. 1938).
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mission desired, it could use these broad powers so conservatively and
so seldom that indenture financing as a whole would hardly be affected.
On the other hand, if the Commission were antagonistic to corporate
business, it could employ this discretionary authority literally to make
indenture financing impossible. 31 Between these extreme positions, neither
of which is immediately probable, lie innumerable degrees of interference
and assistance. The experience of no one issuer will necessarily be dupli-
cated by another, since each indenture can be the subject of individual
rulings.' 32
It has been stressed by the sponsors of the Barkley Bill that it does
not give the Commission any control over such business features of an
indenture as interest rate, maturity date, amount of security, sinking
fund provisions and the like.3 3 There was some doubt, when the bill
was first made public, whether or not these subjects were also intended
to be brought within the discretionary powers, for though not expressly
mentioned they might, by strained construction, be included.' At the
hearings, however, Chairman Douglas stated expressly that the deter-
mination of these "business" matters was intended to remain a private
concern, that the bill dealt only with the "non-business" provisions of
an indenture.
It is unfortunate that the exclusion of these subjects has not been made
explicit,135 for at best the distinction is a difficult one to maintain. In
several places the bill appears to touch "business" subjects; for example,
the release and substitution of security is as much a business matter'3 as
provisions for a sinking fund, and where the line is supposed to be
drawn remains in doubt. It is also open to question whether a permanent
line is intended; one cannot be sure how long a conservative interpreta-
tion would satisfy future administrators. The framework of the bill,
excepting the introductory section, would be weakened with less control;
but it could easily accommodate more control, and the measure looks in
131. It would be not at all unreasonable to discuss the Barkley Bill from the viewpoint
that it is intended to control, retard or perhaps eventually eliminate the direct flow of
private capital into private business and industrial enterprise. It might lle used for that
end, and it may receive some support for that reason; but as Chairman Douglas expressly
and vigorously disclaimed any such intention before the House subcommittee [Houst'
HEARING 31, 32] that view is not a subject for consideration in this article.
132. See HousE HEARING 34.
133. See Burke, supra note 71; HousE HEARING 19, 22.
134. See HAUSSERMANN, PROPOSED FEDERAL TRUsT INDENTRit AcT [a lecture deliv-
ered before the Investment Bankers Conference, Inc., New England District, at Boston,
Mass., December 29, 1937, privately printed] 9.
135. This opinion was urged before the subcommittee of the House in April, 19,1.
HousE HEARING 59-60. But no change in this respect is made in the present measure.
136. Negative pledge clauses afford another example. Their inclusion in an indenture
was spoken of by Chairman Douglas as "a matter of business judgment." SENA'r
HEARING 31.
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that direction. An amendment specifically embracing business elements
could be easily made. Since the Commission, in determining what con-
stitutes a desirable indenture, offers to assume the exercise of what is
essentially investment judgment, there would be no real point of principle
involved, so long as investors continue to suffer from their own or others'
improvidence, in seeking control over many other matters which for the
time being are left to private determination. The theory of the bill is
so broad that successful defense against a further extension of power is
made very difficult.
Without any extension, however, the Barkley Bill essentially supplants
private control of indentures with governmental control. The actual
drafting of most of the indenture is subjected to the conclusive authority
of a federal agency. This offers two possibilities of advantage: it creates
an opportunity for the investor's interests to be represented more directly
than heretofore, and it promises to jolt indentures out of the rut which
generations of harassed draftsmen have worn. There is substantially
unanimous agreement that some common indenture provisions should and
can be strengthened in the investor's favor. There is also complete dis-
satisfaction with the exaggerated complication and length of the modem
instrument.
An expert, impartial study of the typical indenture could undoubtedly
improve and simplify it in some degree. But the task is imposing,1 3T and
it requires the highest technical competence. Such a study would be
severely if not fatally handicapped by the pressure of having its day-to-
day conclusions actually determining the course of very important trans-
actions. 138 It is not detracting from the excellent record and accomplish-
ments of the Securities and Exchange Commission, with its past and
present membership, to express doubt whether any governmental agency,
constituted as the Commission is and carrying such a heavy burden of
duties, could possibly discharge such work effectively without making
some very costly errors.
The corporate indenture is not a fair field for experiment; a mistake
can have very serious consequences. Indentures not infrequently remain
in force twenty, thirty or fifty years, and any misstep which the Com-
mission might make in fixing an indenture's terms would affect the
parties to it for the whole time, 3 ' unless the securities could be called or
137. See Stetson, supra note 6, at 25-27; Drinker, supra note 37.
138. The six-months' grace period between enactment of the bill and its effective
date would permit some of the preliminary work to be completed, but to enpect, as Chair-
man Douglas has intimated, that a workable set of principles and rules could be worked
out in that period seems much too optimistic. See HousE HEAING 35, 85, 89, 90.
139. This point was raised at both the Senate and the House committee hearings. Sir-
ATE HEAING 142; HousE HARING 76-77. In reply Chairman Douglas said that any
unworkable provision could be taken care of by later amendment of the indenture. HousE
HEAR G 35. But since a simple way to escape the whole force of the act would be to
provide an easy amendment procedure, it is obvious that the Commission would keep
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the indenture amended. That some errors would occur is a human cer-
tainty, as appears when some of the subjects to be affected by rulings are
considered.
Self interest of draftsmen does not explain the failure to solve a num-
ber of important problems of the indenture. The reason is found in their
inherent difficulty, generally enhanced by the necessity of adapting the
instrument to the statutes and decisions of many jurisdictions. No fully
satisfying answer'has been given to these key questions:
How far should individual security holders be able to enforce the
security contract? If every holder of a bond or debenture could sue in
his own right for the principal sum immediately upon a default,""0 that
event might produce a race of diligence between hundreds of plaintiffs.
The confusion would be heightened if an individual right to realize upon
the security were granted. 41 For the protection of the security holders
themselves a restraint on such action must be imposed, yet too great a
restraint may place a minority at serious disadvantage.4 2
To what extent should lists of security holders be maintained and made
available? It is obviously undesirable to have such a list controlled by
strict watch on amendment provisions with a view to keeping the indenture as approved
intact. Also if an indenture can be amended too easily its protective features are weak-
ened, and the marketability of the securities may be affected.
140. The right to sue at normal maturity is much more generally accorded by deci-
sions, and by the indentures themselves, than the right to sue upon the acceleration of
maturity by default. Posner, supra note 13, at 774-775. Either right, however, is a matter
of some controversy. Certain rights the security holders in any event retain: they may
sue to prevent impairment of the security, and they may in certain circumstances obtain
the removal of the trustee. Posner, supra note 13, at 776-778; Jones, supra note 34, at
20-21.
One definite step is taken in the bill towards increasing the individual rights of the
security holders. §314 would forbid the inclusion in a qualified indenture of any
provision permitting, with or without the consent of a percentage of security holders,
reduction in principal, postponement of maturity, or postponement of interest payments
for more than a year. The object of this provision is to bar "voluntary reorganizations"
and to force all rearrangements of indenture debts, unless one hundred per cent couIsent
is obtained, to be made by a bankruptcy or equity court. See HovsE HEARING 35. The
criticism of this provision [see SENATE HEARING 161; HousE HEARING 49-50, 741 illus-
trates the conflict of theories on this general subject.
141. See Batchelder v. Council Grove Water Company, 131 N. Y. 42, 46-47, 29 N. E.
801-802 (1892).
142. In Allan v. Moline Plow Co., 14 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) the Batchelder
case, supra note 141, was cited to sustain the exclusive operation of a similar curb against
a noteholder suing at normal, not accelerated, maturity, even though the acceptance by
ninety per cent of the noteholders of a voluntary reorganization plan made compliance
with the requirement impossible. This decision was criticized in the RrMar, at 62-63,
and conflicting decisions show the variety of opinions held. See (1927) 27 COL. L. Rvv,
443, 579; (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 312, 774; (1935) 33 Micir. L. Ray. 604; (1935) 83 V.
OF PA. L. REv. 679.
Holders of indenture securities have a fiduciary relationship inter sese which courts
have recognized. Linder v. Hartwell R. R., 73 Fed. 320 (C. C. N. D. Ga., 1896) ; Stet-
son, supra note 6, at 45-46.
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an issuer or underwriter interested in concealing or minimizing a default,
or in controlling a reorganization to its own advantage. But it would
be equally unfortunate if a list were made easily available to irresponsible
parties or trouble-makers.'43 It is difficult to see how any rule, no matter
how ingenious, written into the indenture could replace the exercise of
individual judgment in avoiding unscrupulous use and yet permitting
proper accessY.44
What defaults should a trustee publish or make known to security
holders? It is evident that heedlessly giving publicity to unimportant or
inadvertent defaults could do great damage to an issuer and to the holders
of its securities, impairing its credit and depressing security values.14
On the other hand there are some defaults which should not be kept
secret. It would appear almost impossibly difficult to draw this line ac-
curately in advance, and the authors of the bill may not have contemplated
any precise distinction being made, 4 but the bill itself gives widest
latitude.'
47
What ordinary indenture provisions are truly misleading and deceptive,
or against public policy? The example frequently given is that of the
negative pledge clause.' 4 The Commission appears to hold these clauses
in particular disfavor, and certainly there have been cases where faulty
provisions have allowed substantial evasion under cover of technical com-
pliance.'40 Remedies are unsatisfactory and uncertain.' But the negative
143. Such lists are useful "sucker lists" for salesmen of doubtful securities, and their
availability would facilitate "strike" litigation of all kinds.
144. The opposition of views on this subject is well illustrated by the testimony of two
witnesses before the Senate subcommittee, one advocating easy access, the other greater
restriction. SENATE HEARING 94-97, 154-156; see also SEN,%TE HERnING 63-64, 110, 157-
158; HOUSE HEARING 66-67.
The Commission might decide, of course, to leave the matter in the discretion of the
trustee, but it seems much more probable that some specific regulation would be tried.
Section 311 requires indentures to contain adequate provisions for keeping the trustee
informed of the names and addresses of the security holders, and obliging the trustee "to
make such information or the use thereof available to indenture security holders, subject
only to such terms and conditions as the Commission deems not detrimental to the public
interest or the interests of investors."
145. Posner, supra note 13, at 763-764.
146. A rough division could, of course, be marked out, say between defaults in interest
and principal payments and all other defaults, but the Commission might wish to go con-
'tiderably beyond this in many instances. See SEl.ATE HARING 63-69; HousE HE-.%niG
40. Again there are here two schools of thought. See SENATE HF.RING 99-101, 110-111,
155-6, 159; HousE HEARING 40, 66-67.
147. § 312(b).
148. SENATE HE.ARING 82: SENATE REPORT 13.
149. REPORT 10-16. At page 15 it is said, "There can be no doubt that the problem is
primarily one of control over the issuer rather than the trustee." The bill, however,
relies upon control of the trustee which in turn is to supervise the issuer.
150. See Jacob, The Effect of Provision for Ratable Protection of Debenture Holders
in Case of Subsequent Mortgage (1938) 52 I-LRv. L. RLv. 77; Comments (1935) 30 IL
L. REv. 487, (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 97, (1936) 49 HARv. L. R-Ev. 6-20. The case of Kelly
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pledge clause is not intended to give a debenture the full measure of
,security which a bond may have. It is one of the various intermediate
devices which expand the field of financing, enabling an issuer in par-
ticular circumstances to utilize its assets to its best advantage in the
money market. Instances of evasion, which have not been shown to be
more than occasional, 1" are insufficient reason for condemning altogether
a type of clause which serves in general a useful purpose.12
What degree of supervision over an obligor's affairs may reasonably
be required of a trustee? This is one of the most important questions
raised by the Barkley Bill, one on which opinions diverge and the possi-
bilities of error are apparent and serious. If, as the bill proposes, the
trustee's fear of liability is to be the primary guarantee of the good be-
haviour of obligors, then the theoretically complete answer is to make
the trustee responsible for superintending everything which an obligor
should or might do touching his duties and obligations under the in-
denture. 15 3 But this would make indenture financing onerous and ex-
pensive to the point of impossibility. 5 4 An obligor might find itself
attended and scrutinized by the trustees' accountants, engineers and busi-
ness advisers at every turn. The development of indentures shows a very
slow and cautious extension of the trustees' responsibility in this direc-
tion, and although some further increase might well be salutary it should
be planned with very careful and accurate judgment.
These questions and many others' would, under the Barkley Bill, be
determined for each subject indenture by the Commission alone. Every
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497 (S. D. N. Y. 1935), discussed in
the REPORT at 13-15, was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, but the litigation was
compromised before a final decision was reached. The Circuit Court of Appeals' deci-
sion published in 85 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) was later modified upon petition for
rehearing, and, as modified, it did not reverse the lower court but ordered the cause to be
remanded for further findings, the appellate court meanwhile retaining jurisdiction of
the appeals. Since the compromise interrupted the litigation at this point, the Case is of
little value as authority on the legal questions involved.
151. See HousE HEAmRNG 88.
152. The disclosure provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 to some extent constitute
a check upon defective negative pledge clauses. See supra p. 547. The Commission's
suggestion that these clauses be totally eliminated has, however, received some support.
See Posner, supra note 13, at 759; McCollom, supra note 20, at 1233.
153. Until the Commission should actually undertake to prescribe indenture provisions
under the bill one cannot say whether it would in fact require supervisory duties to be
stretched to a prohibitory extent; but the danger that practice might be sacrificed to
theory is emphasized by features of the Lea Bill, sponsored by the Commission, which,
in attempting to provide particular protection, encounters and creates practical difficulties
which may well render the measures wholly unworkable and defeat the end sought. La-
porte, supra note 92; Drinker, The Effect of the Lea Bill on Non-udticial Reorganta-
lions (1938) A 2 CORP. RE0RG. & Am. BANKR. REv. 5.
154. See McCollom, snpra note 20, at 1224 ct seq.; Stetson, supra note 6, at 52.
"155. See supra note 123.
[Vol. 48: 533
SECURITIES AND THE BARKLEY BILL
situation requiring special provisions would, in theory, receive an in-
dividual ruling. But referring these intricate problems to an agency of
government will not necessarily bring about their solution, and it raises
another difficulty. If, in a search for a new balance of interests, or for
any other cause, some entirely impracticable indenture provisions should
be insisted upon, an issuer could have no relief elsewhere. There could
be no appeal to the courts, or, for immediate help, to Congress or legis-
lative representatives, except for possible pressure through political chan-
nels. The financial community could offer no direct assistance. The
experience and special knowledge of the obligor's officers and counsel
might have little weight when matched against a Commissioner's personal
conviction. The risk is a real one. There is as yet much too short an
experience with agencies of this character in our national government
to be at all sure of a tradition of restraint.
But the possibility of unwise or unworkable provisions being required
by a Commission is not the only objection to this phase of the Barklcy
Bill. The total uncertainty in which the measure would place future in-
denture financing is very disturbing to contemplate. Some forecast of
the present Commission's wishes can be made after a study of the Report
and the record of the hearings, but on many important matters there is
no substantial indication what requirements would be fixed. The day
the bill should become law, no one could be sure what terms future in-
dentures would have to contain, what duties a trustee would have to
undertake, or on what conditions additional bonds under outstanding
indentures could be issued. This uncertainty would to a lesser extent be
renewed with each change of Administration and each major shift of
Administration policy. The depressive and deterrent effect of this con-
dition would, especially at the start, be considerable. 150
While moderate and skilful administration of the bill's provisions, if
it were enacted, could allay doubts, it could not dispel them. The Barkley
Bill is planned as a permanent law, to be administered by a succession
of public officials whose standards, abilities and political philosophies are
wholly conjectural. It is possible that the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission may become what each successive administration chooses to make
it, 5 ' and it is unlikely that it will always be completely free from par-
156. The practical undesirability of having uncertainty overhang undenrwiters and
issuers of securities was recognized by the present chainman of the Comnission, writ-
ing, before his appointment, on the Securities Act of 1933. Douglas and Bates, supra
note 56, at 173, 189-192, 211, 214.
157. The five Commissioners are appointed for staggered five year terms [Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. §78 (1934), §4(a)], so that any
administration after three years would have at least three appointments, vithout taking
into account resignations. The Act provides that "Not more than three of such com-
missioners shall be members of the same political party, and in making appointments
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tisanship or incompetence. Indenture financing is vital to a good part
of our nation's major business enterprise. An incompetent administration
of this measure could cause in a short time far greater losses than those
for which the present practice may be responsible. Partisan and discrim-
inatory administration could have even more serious results. The bill
affords a punitive weapon far more effective than the tax investigation.
Thousands of corporations now have outstanding issues of indenture
securities, and maturities with their need for refunding operations are
constantly impending. In turn these corporate obligors would each be
required to satisfy a single agency with unreviewable discretion, its mem-
bers necessarily responsive to the Administration then in power. It is
paradoxical to assume that incompetence and partisanship are frequently
found in the business and financial world, and yet to ignore the possibility
of their appearance in an agency of government.
If increased control over business by the Administrative branch of the
federal government is the primary aim of the Barkley Bill, then there is
no real reason for changing it. But if the desire is solely to remedy faults
in indenture financing, the constructive results of this measure would be
realized at much too high a price in constant instability, unnecessary dis-
location and possible lasting damage.
CONCLUSION
The Barkley Bill, and the Report upon which it is founded, have al-
ready performed a service. They have made prominent the faults of
the present system of corporate indentures, and they have stimulated a
general and energetic exploration of all its aspects. If it would be un-
fortunate to have the Barkley Bill enacted in the present form, it would
be equally unfortunate if substantial improvement by some means were
not achieved.
It may be that the defects of the present practice can be largely reme-
died by voluntary organization and study in which underwriters, issuers
members of different political parties shall be appointed alternately as nearly as may be
practicable," but the influence of this requirement may not be substantial.
In all probability a President could, if he wished, force the earlier retirement of a
Commissioner with whom he was in disagreement. The language of § 1 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act specifying three causes for removal from office, upon which the
Supreme Court in part relied in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602
(1934), does not appear in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In the event
that the President should be held to have no rightful authority to remove a Commissioner
for personal reasons or reasons of policy, resignation could very probably be obtained
through practical rather than legal steps.
The Interstate Commerce Commission affords no proper analogy. Its eleven members
hold office for longer terms (seven years) and its status as an independent agency is
established. 4 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1937) 11, 254-27'4.
(Vol. 48: 533
SECURITIES AND THE BARKLEY BILL
and trustees participate together.' 58 If the Commission should render its
resources of experience and expert personnel available for a study of the
modem indenture, with a view to perfecting its form and improving its
protective features, such work would receive most interested coopera-
tion and would have profound influence. No one is satisfied with the
usual indenture of the present day. Its abbreviation and clarification is
earnestly to be desired. Lawyers and business men alike would welcome
the appearance of simple, standard clauses adapted to achieve the various
indenture purposes. If the Commission were to recommend such pro-
visions, framed after careful study and consultation, the authority of its
recommendation would assure that the suggestions would be considered
by every draftsman, and, so far as they proved valuable, widely adopted.
Here is a way in which the unique resources of a federal agency could
be of great assistance, without any of the risks of concentrated authority
or unwise regulation.
An alternative, more appealing to those who feel positive action to be
necessary, would be a simple statute directed to the major points of
weakness. 5 9 It is not within the scope of this article to offer in detail
a statutory remedy, but it may be proper to suggest what can be attained
by statutory means while yet avoiding some of the major difficulties
which have been discussed.
It would be possible, and desirable, to provide by statute that indentures
which could be reached, as the Barkley Bill reaches them, by the com-
merce and mail powers, should be required to have at least one corporate
trustee. It would be equally feasible to provide that trustees under such
issues should be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and that their registration could be revoked, and their resignation neces-
sitated, if it were established that conflict of interest had actually affected
adversely the conduct of their trust; but this determination should be
subject to review, both as to law and as to facts, by the Federal courts.
Such review would be essential as a check upon arbitrary action.
Relief from the extremes of exculpatory clauses, and some needed
sifting of the law concerning them, could be obtained if the statute were
to include a further provision that after a default in the payment of
interest or principal, and the expiration of a specified maximum grace
period, the trustee should be liable for negligent conduct. There is prece-
dent for such statutory procedure.'0 ° It could be used with respect to
158. This -as strongly urged as a solution at the House subcommittee's hearing.
HOUSE HEAXING 45, 46.
159. See testimony of 0. AV. Haussermann, Hot-sE HXrKNG 79,15), in which this sug-
gestion, in somewhat different form, was made.
160. See, e.g., UNIFOpm CONDITIONAL SALES Acr; N. Y. DEcEuENT ESTATE LAW,
§ 125 [L. 1936, c. 378, as amended by L. 1938, c. 392] ; the Cummins-Carmack amendment
to the IxTERSTATE: ComnEacE AcT [34 STAT. 593, as amended by 44 STAT. 835, 44 STAT.
1448 and 46 STAT. 251, 49 U. S. C. §20(11)]; Cassels, mipra note 29, at 1; ef. LonD ST.
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other parts of an indenture," 1 but it should be sparingly used, and not
invoked unless Congress should be convinced that a particular extension
would be unquestionably desirable. If the original statute were restricted
to the single matter of negligence after default, it is at least reasonably
probable that any later extension, without the pressure of the whole regu-
latory legislation urging it forward, would receive the careful and non-
political consideration which is so clearly necessary.
The measure could stop with these provisions. It would not be the
inclusive remedial legislation which the Barkley Bill is, in potentiality,
but it would have some real force and further admonitory influence. It
would have the advantage of definiteness, and indentures could be drawn
in accordance with its terms in any part of the nation without the need
of sending a representative to confer in Washington. It would not com-
mit the solution of very difficult and important problems to administrative
officers, including the unknown appointees of the future, with a right
to exercise unlimited discretion. It would have the important virtue of
moderation.
This suggestion assumes the reasonable cooperation of obligors, under-
writers and trustees. It assumes that all share an immediate interest in
perfecting the indenture as an instrument for the financing of modern
business. It is not advanced upon the supposition that the partners to an
indenture will inevitably seek to employ deceitful means to pervert the
method or strip the investor of protection. It does not comport with the
belief that if any reform is to be achieved the whole possible extent of
reform must be swept through at once on the flood tide. These qualifica-
tions may limit its effect; they do render it inconsistent with some contem-
porary thought. But it is sincerely believed that the best consideration
of these problems may be attained by detachment from contemporary
thought, and by concentration upon the business purpose which the cor-
porate indenture serves. If the law which has grown up about this instru-
ment hampers it, legislation may be helpful, to liberate but not to restrict.
Indenture securities have earned a place in the national economy, and
the first concern of courts and legislatures should be to keep their place
secure.
LEONAIUS Acr (1859) 22 & 23 Vicr. c. 35 § 31, repealed and replaced by TRtsTE Acr
(1893) 56 & 57 Viet. c. 53 § 24, repealed by 15 GEo. V. (1925) c. 19, § 70, sch. II.
161. Some of the less controversial subjects, such as responsibility for recordation, are
susceptible of similar treatment.
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